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PHILOSOPHIC   SERIES— ISTo.  II 


ENERGY 


EFFICIENT    AInTD    FIT^AL    CAUSE 


/BY  ? 

1 

JAMES   McCOSH,  D.D.,  LL.D.,  D.L.  ; 

Author  of  ''The  Laws  of  Discursive  Thought,"  ''Emotions,"  etc.  ; 

President  of  Princeton  College  ; 


NEW  YORK 

CHARLES    SCRIBNER'S    SONS 

1883 


COPTRiaHT,   1883,   BY 
CHARLES  SCRIBNER'S  SONS 


Tkow's 

Printing  ani>  Hookhinding  Company 

201-213  -^-'"^  Tivelfth  Street 

NEW  YORK 


S^  i.  rjL  jPi  u  jU  u  u  Ji  ij  i-i  >u.» 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS. 


Introduction, 


PAGE 
1 


SECTION  I. 
Physical  Causation, 


SECTION    II. 
Psychical  Causation, ^^ 

SECTION  III. 
Causation  Subjective, ^^ 

SECTION  IV. 
Various  Sorts  op  Causes, ^^ 

SECTION    V. 
Final  Cause, ^^ 


THE0LOGIC&:, 
ENERGY. 

EFFICIENT  AND   FINAL   CAUSE. 


INTKODUCTION. 


The  principle  of  cause  and  effect  is  involved  in  most  of 
the  processes  by  which  we  discover  truth.  True,  there  are 
verities  which  are  perceived  by  intuition,  that  is,  in  looking 
upon  the  objects,  such  as  that  I  exist  and  that  material 
things  exist.  But  it  is  only  a  small  portion  of  our  knowl- 
edge that  is  obtained  by  primary  and  direct  inspection. 
In  the  case  of  other  and  derivative  truths  causation  is  im- 
plied, if  not  in  the  whole,  at  least  in  the  greater  number 
of  them. 

The  principle  has  a  place  in  the  great  body  of  our  con- 
victions as  to  the  past.  I  do  not  see  that  it  has  any  part 
in  memory  which  is  instinctive,  but  it  has  in  all  those 
which  we  reach  by  a  process.  Thus,  we  believe  that  there 
has  been  a  battle  at  a  certain  place,  a  flood  at  a  particular 
spot  on  a  river,  a  fire  in  a  dwelling,  because  we  discover 
effects,  which  we  argue  imply  a  cause.  Thus,  we  argue 
that  certain  strata  in  the  earth's  surface  are  the  deposits  of 
an  ancient  ocean,  and  that  other  portions  have  been  thrown 
up  by  a  volcano.  Even  in  regard  to  events  which  we  be- 
lieve on  human  testimony,  we  assume  that  the  actors  have 
been  swayed  by  the  same  motives  as  men  now  are. 

It  will  be  allowed  more  readily  that  our  reasonable  ex- 


3  INTRODUCTION-. 

pectations  as  to  the  future  depend  so  far  on  this  principle. 
We  argue,  whether  we  are  conscious  of  it  or  not,  that  the 
causes  now  operating  in  physical  nature  and  in  men's 
minds  will  act  in  the  future  as  in  the  past ;  that  these  col- 
leges and  schools  w^ill  continue  to  produce  a  high  mental 
cultivation  ;  that  these  improved  modes  of  agriculture  will 
pi'oduce  a  richer  crop,  and  that  the  abuses  in  certain  old 
countries  will,  in  the  end,  produce  a  revolution  like  those 
of  France  and  America. 

The  principle  is  involved  in  the  common  arguments  for 
the  existence  of  God.  True,  those  who  believe  with 
Schleiermacher  that  God  is  perceived  by  direct  intuition 
do  not  need  this  premise.  But  the  proofs  commonly  urged, 
for  example,  that  from  the  adaptation  of  one  thing  to 
another  to  accomplish  a  good  end,  and  that  from  the  high 
ideas  in  the  mind  of  the  infinite  the  perfect  proceed,  as  has 
been  shown  by  Kant,  on  the  principle  of  causation  ;  these 
collocations  and  aspirations  imply  a  designing  mind  to 
produce  them. 

Causation  is  thus  one  of  the  bonds  which  connect  the 
present  with  the  past  and  the  future,  and  the  whole  with 
God  as  the  Great  First  Cause.  If  this  be  so,  it  is  surely  de- 
sirable, it  is  indeed  of  vast  importance,  to  have  the  nature  of 
cause  and  our  belief  in  it  accurately  unfolded,  and  brought 
into  consistency  with  modern  science.  David  Hume,  in 
establishing  his  philosophical  scepticism,  labored  with  all 
his  might  to  loosen  the  causal  connection.  In  the  defence 
of  truth  this  principle  comes  next  in  order  to  that  of  the 
Criteria  of  Truth. 


SECTION  I. 

PHYSICAL   CAUSATION. 

The  subject  will  be  made  clearer  by  carefully  distinguish- 
ing Causation  Objective  and  Subjective:  that  is  causation 
in  itself  whether  we  observe  it  or  no  (a  spark  will  kindle 
gunpowder  without  our  taking  notice  of  it),  and  the  princi- 
ple in  the  mind  which  leads  us  believe  in  it. 

I  am  not  singular  in  holding  that  the  whole  subject  of 
Cause  has  become  confused  in  the  minds  of  men,  especially 
educated  men,  and  that  the  time  has  come  for  reconsidering 
it  in  the  light  which  recent  investigation  furnishes.  In  our 
day  two  or  three  doctrines  have  been  propounded  and,  I 
believe,  demonstrated,  which  require  us  to  review  and  re- 
vise the  doctrine  of  causation,  more  especially  in  its  rela- 
tion to  Force,  Energy,  and  Power. 


There  is  a  duality  or  plurality  m  Causation,  that 
is,  there  are  two  or  more  acting  bodies  in  all  physical 
causes.  There  were  thinkers  who  had  a  glimpse  of  that 
doctrine  from  an  old  date.  Aristotle  spoke  of  a  avvairiov 
which  Sir  W.  Hamilton  translates  Concause.'  But  this 
truth  was  first  clearly  enunciated  by  Mr.  J.  S.  Mill  {Logic, 
Book  lY.,  Chap.  Y.).  "  The  statement  of  the  cause  is  in- 
complete unless  in  some  shape  or  other  we  introduce  all 
the  conditions.     A  man  takes  mercury,  goes  out  of  doors, 

'  Sextus  Empiricus  speaks,  III.  15,  of  (ruvairioy,  avyepy6v,  avveKTiKu,  all 
pointing  to  joint  action. 


4  PHYSICAL   CAUSATION". 

and  catches  cold.  AVe  say,  perhaps,  that  the  cause  of  his 
taking  cold  was  the  exposure  to  the  air.  It  is  clear,  how- 
ever, that  his  having  taken  mercury  may  have  been  a 
necessary  condition  of  his  catching  cold  ;  and  though  it 
might  consist  with  usage  to  say  that  the  cause  of  his  attack 
was  exposure  to  the  air,  to  be  accurate  we  ought  to  say 
that  the  cause  was  exposure  to  the  air  while  under  the  ef- 
fect of  mercury." 

The  doctrine  had  occurred  to  me  before  I  read  Mr. 
Mill's  "  Logic ;  "  but  as  he  published  it  first,  I  do  not  claim 
any  credit  in  it.  As  approaching  it,  however,  from  a 
somewhat  different  di;'ection,  I  believe  I  can  make  it  more 
explicit  and  comprehensive.  In  all  physical  action  there 
are  two  or  more  bodies,  molecular  or  molar ;  at  the  present 
stage  of  science  I  ought  to  add  that  the  body  may  be  the 
ether  in  which  the  undulations  of  light  take  place.  'Now 
the  cause — by  which  I  mean  that  which  invariably  has 
produced  the  effect,  and  will  invariably  produce  it — con- 
sists in  the  mutual  action  of  two  or  more  bodies  ;  that  is, 
their  action  on  each  other.  Thus,  in  the  case  adduced  by 
Mr.  Mill,  the  true  cause  of  the  effect,  the  cold,  was  not  the 
air  alone  or  the  body  alone,  but  the  air  and  the  body  un- 
der mercury.  Without  the  concurrence,  or  rather  the 
joint  action  of  the  two,  the  effect  would  not  have  been 
produced.  It  is  the  same  in  all  other  cases.  A  ball  Rt 
rest  is  struck  by  a  ball  in  motion  ;  the  one  ball  is  made  '■'  t 
move,  the  other  has  its  motion  stayed  ;  the  cnuse  consists 
of  the  two  balls  in  a  certain  state,  and  the  effect  the  balls 
in  another  state.  A  picture-f i-ame  falls  from  a  w^all  and 
breaks  a  jar  standing  on  a  table  below ;  we  say  that  the 
frame,  or  rather  the  fall  of  the  frame,  was  the  cause  of 
the  fracture  of  the  jar.  But  the  true  cause,  that  which 
forever  will  produce  the  same  effect,  is  the  frame  falling 
with  a  certain  momentum  and  the  brittlenes.3  of  the  jar. 


PLURALITY   IN   CAUSE   AND   EFFECT.  0 

Had  the  frame  come  down  with  less  violence,  or  the  jar 
been  stronger,  there  might  have  been  no  breakage.  In 
most  cases  of  action  a  considerable  number,  in  some  a 
vast  number  and  variety  of  agents  combine  to  produce 
the  result.  Take  the  sprouting  of  a  flower  in  spring :  in 
the  cause  there  are  the  increased  heat  and  light  of  the  sim, 
the  state  of  the  plant  in  the  earth,  and  the  state  of  the  soil. 
Without  the  concurrence  of  all  these  the  effect  would  not 
be  produced. 

II. 

Secondly,  there  is  a  duality  or  plurality  in  the 
EFFECT.  This  is  a  further  truth  which  Mr.  Mill  has  not 
expounded,  but  which  occurred  to  me  as  I  was  thinking 
out  the  doctrine  which  Mr.  Mill  preceded  me  in  unfolding. 
It  follows  from  Mr.  Mill's  doctrine  when  it  is  properly  un- 
derstood, and  seems  to  me  to  be  quite  as  certain,  and  it  is 
fully  more  important  and  of  wider  range  in  its  applications. 
Thus,  in  Mr.  Mill's  illustration  the  cause  was  the  state  of 
the  atmosphere  and  the  body  as  affected  by  mercmy ;  the 
effect  was  the  same  atmosphere  insensibly  changed  in 
temperature,  and  the  body  under  a  cold.  In  the  second 
case  the  true  cause  consisted  of  the  two  balls,  one  in  mo- 
tion striking  the  other  at  rest ;  the  effect  (which  would  be 
forever  produced  by  the  same  cause)  the  ball  which  was 
at  rest  moving  and  the  ball  which  was  in  motion  at  rest. 
In  the  third  case  the  cause  was  the  picture-frame  with  a 
certain  momentum  striking  a  jar  of  a  certain  structure  ; 
the  effect  was  the  frame  losing  part  of  its  momentum  and 
the  jar  broken.  In  the  case  of  the  plant  germinating 
there  nmst  have  been  in  the  effect  changes — it  may  be  in- 
capable of  measurement — in  all  the  agents  acting  as  the 
causes  in  the  sun's  heat  and  light  absorbed  in  the  earth 
and  in  the  plant  sprouting. 


6  PHYSICAL   CAUSATIOT^. 

Taking  tliese  views  witli  us,  it  may  be  of  great  use  to 
have  appropriate  and  definite  phrases  to  express  tliem. 
The  word  Cause,  that  which  invariably  produces  the  effect, 
should  be  reserved  for  the  combination  of  agencies  pro- 
ducing the  result.  The  cause  of  the  man's  taking  cold  is 
not  merely  the  cold  atmosphere  or  his  frame  being  aft'ected 
by  mercury,  but  in  the  two  acting  on  each  other.  The 
word  Effect  should  in  like  manner  be  applied  to  the  com- 
bined result,  and  comprises  the  change  in  the  air  as  well 
as  the  colded  affection  of  the  body.  In  the  other  illustra- 
tive cases  it  implies  the  movement  of  the  one  ball  and  the 
staying  of  the  other  ;  the  loss  of  momentum  in  the  picture- 
frame  as  well  as  the  breaking  of  the  jar ;  and  the  change 
in  the  rays  of  heat  and  light  coming  from  the  sun  as  well 
as  the  germinating  of  the  plant. 

As  causes  are  dual  or  plural,  it  is  proper  to  have  phrases 
to  express  the  parts.  The  law  is  often  stated  that  the 
same  cause  always  produces  the  same  effect  in  the  same 
circumstances.  But  in  order  to  clearness  and  accuracy  it 
is  essential  to  specify  what  are  the  circumstances  ;  it  is  in 
fact  necessary  to  put  them  into  the  cause,  as  without  them 
the  effect  would  not  follow.  In  order  to  the  germinating 
of  the  flower  there  is  not  only  the  state  of  the  plant  and 
soil,  but  the  additional  heat  of  the  sun.  All  the  acting 
parts  may  be  called  agents  or  agencies,  Avithout  specifying 
what  they  are.  They  are  bodies  in  a  certain  state  acting 
on  other  bodies. 

Yery  often  one  of  these  agents  is  more  important  in  it- 
self, or  in  our  estimation,  or  for  our  present  purpose,  than 
the  others  ;  this  is  designated  pre-eminently  the  cause,  and 
little  or  no  evil  may  arise  from  this  provided  always  that 
it  be  understood  that  this  agent  needs  one  or  more  co- 
operating agents  which  are  parts  of  the  full  cause.  If  it 
be  said  that  the  cold  air  was  the  cause  of  the.  man  being 


CAUSE  AND    CONDITIOISr.  7 

coldedj  it  was  because  his  body  was  disposed  toward  such 
ail  issue  by  mercury.  It  is  not  eas}^,  or  perhaps  even  pos- 
sible, to  lay  down  a  rule  as  to  wdiich  of  the  agents  should 
be  called  the  special,  the  main,  or  the  prominent  cause, 
for  the  cause  consists  in  the  mutual  action  of  the  whole. 
When  man  is  working  he  often  calls  in  one  agent  to  pro- 
duce an  intended  effect.  If  he  wishes  to  kindle  a  heap  of 
straw,  the  agent  he  attends  to  is  the  fire  he  applies  ;  if  he 
wishes  a  good  crop  from  his  ground,  he  looks  to  the  manure ; 
if  he  wishes  to  be  cured  of  a  disease,  he  selects  his  medi- 
cine ;  though  in  all  such  cases  there  is  need  of  co-operation 
in  the  state  of  the  straw,  or  of  the  ground,  or  of  his  bodily 
frame.  In  nature  there  is  often  one  agent  that  is  particu- 
larly potent.  When  a  tree  is  struck  by  lightning  it  is  the 
electricity  that  is  specially  noticed,  though  the  structure  of 
the  tree  had  also  to  do  with  the  effect  produced. 

Fixing  on  the  agent  that  is  most  prominent  in  itself  or 
in  our  eyes  as  the  cause  or  special  force,  then  the  co-opera- 
ting agent  may  be  called  the  Occasion.  This  phrase  is 
specially  applied  to  circumstances  which  cast  up  to  call  forth 
a  power  into  exercise,  or  to  work  along  with  causes  steadily 
operating.  Thus,  that  ill-constructed  house  fell  on  the  oc- 
casion of  a  storm  arising.  I  was  prompted  to  write  a  letter 
to  a  friend  by  my  affection  ;  but  the  occasion  was  his  suffer- 
ing a  severe  loss  ;  the  two  actually  called  forth  the  letter. 
Malebranche  was  the  philosopher  who  brought  the  phrase 
"  occasional  cause  "  into  general  use.  He  represented  the 
will  of  God  as  the  true  cause  of  all  creative  action,  but  the 
volition  of  man  might  be  the  occasion  of  the  forthputting 
of  the  Divine  Powxr.  Thus,  when  I  move  my  arm  the 
true  cause  is  the  Divine  Will,  but  my  purpose  is  the  occa- 
sional cause.  In  such  a  case  we  may  allowably  give  a 
prominence  to  the  Divine  Power,  but  it  should  be  noticed 
that  while  one  of  the  agents  is  the  important  one,  the 


8  PHYSICAL   CAUSATIO]Sr. 

other  or  others,  the  action  of  the  brain  and  nei-ves,  are 
necessary  to  the  production  of  the  precise  consequence, 
which  will  not  follow  without  the  co-operation. 

We  are  thus  enabled  to  give  a  philosophical  explanation 
of  what  is  meant,  or  rather  what  should  be  meant,  by  Con- 
dition^ a  phrase  so  often  used  vaguely  and  illegitimately 
in  the  present  day  in  its  application  to  physical  operation. 
In  order  to  be  rid  of  an  agent  or  to  drive  it  into  a  corner, 
it  is  said  that  it  is  simply  a  condition.  In  order  to  the  pro- 
duction of  a  given  effect,  a  certain  agent  is  fixed  on  as  pro- 
ducing an  end,  the  other  or  others  are  represented  as  simply 
conditions.  As  proving  design  we  show  that  animals  with 
a  stomach  for  dio^estins;  flesh  have  also  claws  and  strons; 
muscles  to  catch  and  hold  their  prey.  But  saw  attempt  is 
made  to  do  away  with  the  force  of  the  argument  by  urging 
that  these  adjuncts  are  merely  the  conditions  of  the  ma- 
chine working.  But  properly  understood  the  argument 
lies  in  the  circumstance  that  the  co-operating  conditions 
have  met.  The  presence  of  strings  in  a  hai'p  is  a  condition 
of  it  producing  music,  but  the  evidence  of  design  is  in  the 
presence  and  combination  of  the  necessary  strings. 

We  may  legitimately  and  conveniently  use  such  phrases 
provided  we  understand  them  oin-selves  and  let  our  readers 
or  hearers  understand  what  we  mean  b}^  them.  But  it 
should  be  distinctly  explained  that  all  the  agents  acting, 
whether  circumstances,  occasions,  or  conditions,  constitute 
the  cause  without  which  the  eifect  would  not  follow. 

It  is  needful  to  make  like  explanations  and  come  to  the 
same  understanding  as  to  the  Effect.  In  all  cases  of  physi- 
cal action  the  eifect  is  also  dual  or  plural ;  it  consists  of 
two  or  more  agents  changed — I  hope  to  show  the  same 
agents  as  are  in  the  cause.  These  constitute  what  has 
been,  and  what  will  always  be,  produced  by  the  cause. 
But  it  often  happens  that  a  special  end  is  contemplated 


CONDITIONS   AND   INCIDENTS.  9 

when  we  set  an  agent  or  agencies  aworking ;  and  wlien 
this  is  effected  it  is  regarded  as  the  proper  or  the  only 
effect.  Bnt  there  may  be  other  consequences  which  we 
did  not  consider  or  look  for,  or  which  we  regard  as  minor 
or  irrelevant  ones.  We  wish  for  a  shower  to  refresh  the 
ground  ;  as  it  falls  it  accomplishes  that  end,  but  it  may  also 
so  swell  a  stream  that  it  works  destruction  as  it  overflows 
its  banks.  A  new  machine  is  invented  which  produces  a 
greater  amount  of  work,  but  it  throws  a  number  of  people, 
who  followed  the  old  methods,  out  of  employment.  It  is 
desirable  to  have  a  phrase  to  denote  these  secondary  effects, 
as  they  are  regarded ;  and  they  may  be  described  as  Con- 
comitants, or  more  expressly  as  Incidents  or  Incidentals, 
Perhaps  some  would  call  them  Accidents,  and  they  may 
be  so  called  as  they  were  not  intended,  as  when  one  flres 
an  overcharged  gun  and  is  wounded  by  its  striking  back- 
ward. But  these  accidents  are  cjuite  as  nmch  caused  by 
the  agents  as  the  others  that  were  expected.  In  all  cases 
the  effect  properly  understood  consists  of  the  whole  of  the 
agents  that  have  been  acting  put  in  a  new  state.  Any  one 
who  sets  new  agencies  agoing,  say  starting  a  new  trade  or 
passing  a  new  law,  is  bound  to  look  not  merely  to  one  but 
all  the  consequences  that  must  follow. 


III. 

The  Coxservation  of  Energy. — It  has  long  been  known 
and  acknowledged  that  the  sum  of  matter  in  the  cosmos  is 
always  one  and  the  same.  We  burn  a  piece  of  paper  and 
it  disappears  from  our  view,  but  it  is  not  annihilated. 
One  portion  of  the  matter  has  gone  down  in  ashes,  the 
other  has  gone  up  in  smoke,  and  it  is  conceivable  we  might 
bring  the  scattered  particles  together,  and  they  would  be- 
come the  original  paper. 


10  PHYSICAL    CAUSATIOX. 

Imperious  Cesar  dead  and  turned  to  clay 
Might  stop  a  hole  to  keep  the  wind  away. 

It  has  been  proven  in  onr  day  that  the  same  is  true  of 
the  energy  of  matter.  This  doctrine  was  anticipated  hy 
several  philosophic  physicists/  but  was  established  in  onr 
day  by  Mayer,  by  Joule,  by  Grove,  and  others.  Accord- 
ing to  it,  the  sum  of  energy  potential  and  actual  capable  of 
being  brought  into  operation  or  in  operation,  is  always  one 
and  the  same.  It  cannot  be  increased  and  it  cannot  be 
diminished  by  any  human,  indeed,  any  mundane  agency. 
The  doctrine  is  thus  stated  by  Clerk  Maxwell :  *•'  The  total 
energy  of  any  body  or  system  of  bodies  can  neither  be  in- 
creased nor  diminished  by  any  mutual  action  of  tlicse 
bodies,  though  it  may  be  transformed  into  any  one  of  the 
forms  of  which  energy  is  susceptible."  The  amount  of 
energy  is  constant  if  unaffected  by  any  agent  external  to 
itself.  If  acted  on  from  without  the  energy  will  bo  in- 
creased by  what  has  been  communicated.  If  it  acts  on 
bodies  without,  the  energy  will  be  diminished  by  the  work 
done.  When  any  portion  leaves  one  body  it  passes  into 
another.  If  two  balls  strike  each  other,  they  have  the  same 
amount  of  energy  before  they  strike  and  after  they  strike, 
though  the  energy  may  be  decreased  in  one  and  increased 
to  the  same  extent  in  the  other.     When  the  energy  dis- 

^  It  has  been  shown  (Thomson  and  Tait's  Natural  Philosophy,  §  269) 
that  Newton  had  seized  the  principle  which  leads  to  the  doctrine,  "  Work 
done  on  any  system  of  bodies  lias  its  equivalent  in  the  form  of  work 
done  against  friction,  molecular  forces  or  gravity  if  there  be  no  accelera- 
tion ;  but  if  there  be  acceleration  part  of  the  work  is  expended  in  over- 
coming resistance  to  acceleration,  and  the  additional  kinetic  energy  de- 
veloped is  equivalent  to  the  work  so  spent."  It  can  be  shown,  I  think, 
that  Leibnitz  also  approached  the  doctrine  from  another  side.  In  his 
letters  to  M.  L'Hospital  he  speaks  of  "I'egalite  de  la  cause  et  de  I'ef- 
fect,"  and  says,  "la  force  se  conserve  toujours."  This  points  to  the 
principle.  Mayer,  who  did  as  much  as  any  other  man  to  establish  the 
doctrine,  also  speaks  of  the  effect  being  equal  to  the  cause. 


CORPwELATION   OF   FORCES.  11 

appears  in  one  form,  say  in  mechanical  force  moving  a 
mass,  it  appears  in  another,  say  in  heat,  which  is  molecu- 
lar motion. 

It  is  an  integrant  part  of  this  doctrine  that  the  physical 
forces  are  all  correlated,  a  truth  beautifully  expounded  by 
Grove  in  his  "  Correlation  of  the  Physical  Forces."  The 
energy  may  take  various  forms — say  the  purely  mechanical, 
the  chemical,  the  electric,  the  magnetic — perhaps  also  the 
gravitative,  which  may  be  a  somewhat  weak  form  of  the 
correlated  forces.  These  forms  are  capable  of  being  trans- 
mitted into  each  other,  and  this  in  definite  quantity :  so 
much  mechanical  force  into  so  much  chemical  force,  which 
chemical  force  may  be  reconverted  into  the  mechanical. 
This  shows  the  whole  physical  forces  of  our  world  to  be 
correlated  and  capable  of  being  exchanged  for  one  another, 
the  sum  of  energy  remaining  the  same. 

It  may  not  be  easy  to  show  the  full  relation  between 
these  three  doctrines,  which  I  hold  to  be  severally  estab- 
lished. But  there  is  no  inconsistency  between  them. 
Perhaps  the  full  doctrine  may  be  so  stated  as  to  embrace 
all  the  three  and  make  them  aspects  of  one  grand  truth. 
Our  w^orld  may,  as  the  Pythagoreans  supposed,  be  like  a 
closed  globe  with  an  incalculably  large  but  definite  number 
of  bodies  in  it.  These  act  and  react  upon  each  other,  pro- 
ducing all  the  activity,  all  the  movement  in  our  world. 
The  bodies  act  on  each  other,  and  form  a  cause.  In  doing 
so  they  modify  each  other  and  the  result  is  the  effect. 
Meanwhile  the  sum  of  matter  and  the  sum  of  energy  in 
the  bodies  continue  one  and  the  same,  and  both  are  inca- 
pable of  increase  or  diminution.  This  is  at  least  an  in- 
telligible doctrine,  and  embraces  the  three  truths  which 
have  been  separately  stated,  and  seems  in  perfect  consist- 
ency with  all  that  has  been  established  in  regard  both  to 
the  persistence  of  matter  and  the  persistence  of  energy. 


12  PHYSICAL   CAUSATIOIS-. 

I  am  prepared  to  stand  by  and  defend  the  statement 
now  made.  But  when  I  inquire  more  particularly  into 
the  nature  of  things  involved  in  causation,  I  feel  that  I  am 
treading  darkly  and  have  to  guard  my  steps.  Important 
questions  are  pressed  upon  me,  and  I  have  to  speak  with- 
out dogmatisni. 

What  is  the  relation  of  energy  to  causation  ?  Energy  is 
now  the  favorite  phrase  employed  to  express  the  activity 
of  matter.  Energy  produces  changes.  But  the  change 
must  be  in  something.  Physical  energy  is  in  the  system 
of  bodies.  By  it  one  body  acts  on  another.  There  must 
be  energy  of  some  sort  in  every  system  of  bodies  at  all 
times.  But  the  body  acts  only  when  another  body  is 
present.  When  two  or  more  bodies  act  on  each  other  we 
have  cause.  Cause  is  that  which  will  ever  produce  the 
same  effects. 

Energy  and  cause  must  be  realities  quite  as  much  as 
matter  is.  Indeed,  energy  and  causation  seem  to  be  in  the 
very  nature  of  matter.  Energy  is  the  power  that  acts  in 
matter.  Matter,  when  it  acts,  acts  causally.  The  energy 
in  the  two  or  more  bodies  acting  as  the  cause  is  the  power 
in  causation. 

Energy  is  said  to  be  potential  and  actual  or  kinetic. 
Wlien  energy  is  merely  potential  the  bodies  are  not  in  evi- 
dent action  of  any  kind.  The  energy  becomes  real  or  ac- 
tual when  a  body  comes  into  a  relation  of  mutual  action 
with  another  body.     There  is  now  causation. 

Some  would  get  rid  of  energy  in  physics  by  affirming 
that  the  whole  phenomenon  consists  in  motion.  But  there 
is  energy,  potential  energy,  when  there  is  no  seen  motion. 
There  is  energy  in  that  fragment  of  marble  on  my  table, 
and  this  when  the  body  is  not  moving.  Energy  is  that 
which  produces  motion.  The  energy  is  measured  by  the 
work  it  does,  that  is,  by  the  motion  it  produces. 


ENERGY.  13 

The  ball  A,  as  it  moves  by  its  energy,  strikes  the  ball 
B,  loses  its  energy,  and  rests.  What  is  the  difference  be- 
tween A  moving  and  A  at  rest  ?  The  answer  is  that  it 
has  an  energy  in  the  former  case,  which  it  has  not  in  the 
latter.  It  will  not  regain  its  energy  and  be  able  to  move 
till  it  gets  it  from  some  other  body. 

It  has  to  be  added  that  the  body  without  the  energy  has 
the  capacity  {Bvva/jbc<;)  of  receiving  it.'  "  Energy,"  says 
Clerk  Maxwell,  "  cannot  exist  except  in  connection  with 
matter "  (Matter  and  Motion,  p.  165).  We  have  a  like 
statement  by  the  authors  of  "  The  Unseen  Universe  "  (p. 
106).  "Energy  is  never  found  separate  from  matter, 
so  that  we  might  define  matter  as  the  seat  or  vehicle  of 
energy — that  which  is  essential  to  the  existence  of  the 
known  forms  of  energy,  without  which,  therefore,  there 
could  be  no  transformation  of  energy  and  therefore  no 
life  such  as  we  now  know  it."  It  is  commonly  said  that 
the  energy  is  in  the  body.  Sometimes  the  body  has  more 
and  sometimes  less  of  this  energy.  The  stone  taken  to 
the  top  of  a  tower  has  energy  which  it  loses  when  it  fails 
to  the  foot.  The  spring  has  more  energy  because  of  en- 
ergy expended  in  bending  it.  But  the  body  has  the  ca- 
pacity all  the  while  to  receive  energy.  Amid  all  changes 
the  body  continues  with  its  capacity. 

Let  us  now  look  at  bodies  acting  according  to  the  prin- 
ciples laid  down.     Without  attempting  to  explain  their 

^  Physicists  have  taken  their  phraseology  from  Aristotle,  but  have 
changed  it.  I  am  not  sure  whether  it  would  not  have  been  better  had 
they  adhered  to  it  more  closely.  He  has  a  5yj/aujy,  a  capacity,  and  an 
eyef,yeia,  or  a  power  in  actual  exercise.  This  is  very  much  the  modern 
distinction  between  potential  and  actual  energy.  Between  these  two 
he  had  ej/TeAe'xeta,  or  readiness  for  action,  a  phrase  which  his  commen- 
tators have  had  a  difficulty  in  comprehending.  It  might  have  an  ap- 
propriate meaning  if  applied  to  the  two  bodies  brought  into  such  a  re- 
lation that  they  are  rsady  to  act. 


14  PHYSICAL   CAUSATION. 

exact  nature  or  to  enumerate  them,  let  us  designate  the 
physical  agencies  operating  in  our  world  by  the  letters  of 
the  alphabet,  and  view  them  acting.  A  ball  at  rest  is 
struck  by  a  ball  in  motion.  Let  us  call  the  ball  at  rest  A 
and  the  ball  in  motion  B.  The  two  constitute  the  cause 
which  is, 

TJie  cause  xVB. 

As  they  act  the  effect  follows :  A  moves  while  B's  motion 
is  stayed,  and  as  the  effect  we  have  bodies  changed, 

The  effect  A\B\ 
But  in  its  motion  A  strikes  C,  and  B  is  struck  by  D,  and 
we  have 

Two  Causes  A'C  and  B'D, 
and  the 

Double  effect  A'C  and  B'D\ 

But  these  agents  come  to  act  on  other  agents,  E,  F,  G,  H, 
and  we  have  a 

Complex  result,  A^E,  CT,  B^G,  D'll. 

On  the  supposition  that  these  agencies  are  in  a  closed 
ball  and  act  on  each  other  and  on  nothing  else,  the  sum  of 
energy  would  be  one  and  the  same,  while  each  body  might 
be  gaining  or  losing  energy,  one  or  both. 

In  the  first  action  of  A  B,  A  gains  energy  from  B  and 
moves,  while  B  loses  what  energy  it  gives  and  is  stayed. 
But  A  going  through  the  air  and  over  a  surface  loses  the 
energy  it  gained,  imparting  it  to  the  air  and  surface,  and 
comes  to  rest ;  and  B  is  struck  by  D  and  gets  the  energy 
it  has  lost  and  moves.  There  is  thus  a  continual  action 
kept  up  among  the  bodies.  The  energy  in  each  body 
varies,  it  may  be  from  moment  to  moment,  but  the  amount 
among  all  the  bodies  continues  the  same.  Certain  impor- 
tant consequences  follow. 

1.  We  see  that  the  effects  come  to  act  as  causes.  Thus 
if  we  represent  the  cause  as  A  B  and  the  effect  as  A'  B', 


GENERAL   RESULTS.  15 

we  see  that  each  of  the  agencies  A'  and  B'  is  ready  to  act 
always  when  combined  with  some  other  agency,  such  as 
C  and  D.  These  last  acting  as  causes  become  effects  which 
may  again  become  causes  in  combination  with  other  or  the 
same  things.  The  conservation  of  energy  thus  keeps  the 
world  the  same  through  ages,  while  these  constant  changes 
give  it  its  activity  ;  the  one  as  it  were  constituting  an  un- 
changing ocean,  the  other  the  tides  that  agitate  it.  It  is 
thus,  as  the  Eleatics  held,  that  everything  is  fixed  and  im- 
mutable, but  equally  true,  as  Heraclitus  and  the  (piXoaocpot 
peovT€<;  taught,  that  everything  is  becoming. 

2.  We  see  what  is  the  inertia  of  body.  Newton's  First 
Law  of  Motion  follows  from  the  principles  we  have  laid 
down.  A  body  at  rest  will  continue  at  rest  forever  unless 
it  is  acted  on  by  some  other  body ;  a  body  in  motion  will 
continue  in  motion  in  the  same  straight  line  unless  stayed 
or  deflected  by  some  other  body.  All  this  is  a  corollary 
from  the  principle  that  causal  action  is  the  action  of  two 
or  more  bodies,  and  that  a  body  will  not  act  unless  acted 
on  by  some  other  body. 

3.  We  see  the  nature  of  the  law  of  action  and  reaction. 
A  body  will  not  act  unless  there  is  some  other  body  acting 
on  it.  Under  this  view  matter  is  passive.  It  acts  only  so 
far  as  it  is  acted  on.  In  another  sense  it  is  active.  One 
body  acts  on  another  body  ;  thus  two  bodies  are  A  and  B, 
and  A  and  B  are  both  changed.  A  at  rest  moves  and  B  is 
stayed.  What  B  loses  in  being  stayed  A  gains  and  moves. 
Til  is  gives  us  Xewton's  Third  Law  of  Motion,  that  Action 
is  always  equal  to  and  the  opposite  of  Reaction.  B  gives 
what  it  loses  to  A,  but  the  sum  of  energy  of  the  two  is  the 
same  after  action  as  before  action.  It  follows  that  the 
energy  given  to  A  is  equal  to  that  lost  by  B. 

4.  It  has  been  disputed  whether  the  cause  and  its  effect 
are  contemporaneous  or   successive.      The   difference   of 


16  PHYSICAL   CAUSATION. 

opinion  springs  from  confused  notions  as  to  tlie  nature  of 
causation.  In  all  causes  there  are  at  least  two  bodies  and 
mutual  action,  botli  action  and  reaction,  and  these  take, 
place  at  the  same  time.  When  one  ball  strikes  another, 
when  oxygen  combines  with  hydrogen,  the  action  on  the 
part  of  both  bodies  is  simultaneous.  But  in  causation 
proper  the  effect  comes  after  the  cause ;  it  is  the  produc- 
tion of  the  cause.  The  gain  of  energy  by  the  one  ball  and 
the  loss  of  it  by  the  other  is  the  consequence  of  the  simul- 
taneous action.  The  water  is  the  product  of  the  chemical 
union  of  the  two  elements. 

5.  It  is  sometimes  stated  that  the  same  effect  may  be 
produced  by  different  causes.  This  is  not  true,  or  it  is 
true,  according  as  we  understand  it.  A  jar  may  be  broken 
by  a  picture  falling  on  it,  but  it  may  also  be  broken  by  a 
stone  flung  at  it.  The  breaking  of  the  jar  may  thus  be 
produced  by  two  different  processes.  But  in  both  cases  the 
breaking  of  the  jar  is  only  part  of  the  effect.  The  full 
effect  in  the  one  case  was  the  jar  broken  and  the  picture 
stayed  ;  in  the  other,  the  jar  broken  with  the  stone  stayed. 

6.  It  is  often  said  that  great  effects  follow  from  small 
causes.  A  cow  kicks  a  kerosene-lamp,  and  first  the  shed 
is  ignited  and  then  the  half  of  a  great  city  is  burned.  The 
British  Government  denies  Colonial  America  a  compara- 
tively small  claim ;  and  a  revolution  breaks  forth  which 
separates  Great  Britain  and  the  United  States  forever. 
But  it  is  not  quite  correct,  it  is  not  the  full  truth,  to  say 
that  one  cause  did  all  this.  In  all  such  cases  there  is  a 
co-operation  and  succession  of  various  causes.  Tlie  fire  is 
carried  on  by  there  being  all  around  inflammable  materials  ' 
to  propagate  it,  and  the  separation  of  the  countries  was 
really  produced  by  a  widespread  discontent.  In  like  man- 
ner a  mighty  agency  may  often  issue  in  a  very  insignifi- 
cant effect,  because  there  are  no  conspiring  powers.    Three 


GENERAL   RESULTS.  17 

very  important   philosophical  doctrines  seem  to  be  thus 
established. 

7.  In  physical  nature  (and  I  speak  at  present  of  no  other) 
the  effect  consists  of  the  bodies  which  have  combined  to 
form  the  cause  being  put  in  a  new  state.  When  the  cause  is 
A  B,  the  effect  is  A'  B'.  The  cause  may  be  more  complex, 
A,  B,  C,  D,  E,  F,  and  all  the  bodies  are  modified  and  appear 
in  this  modified  form  in  the  effect,  A"  B'  C'  D'  E'  F^  Thus 
all  action  is  a  kind  of  evolution  or  development,  a  favorite 
doctrine  of  the  theosophists  of  the  East,  who  draw  all  mun- 
dane things  out  of  other  mundane  things,  and  in  the  last 
resort  all  things  fi'om  God.  This  doctrine  is  commonly  ap- 
prehended in  a  mystical  way  which  favors  pantheism,  but 
it  contains  important  truth,  which  can  and  should  be 
separated  from  the  error  with  which  it  has  been  associated. 
It  is  not  that  the  effect  emanates  or  grows  out  from  the 
cause,  but  it  is  that  the  effect  consists  in  the  bodies  con- 
stituthig  the  cause  being  put  in  a  new  state  or  form. 

8.  It  is  wrong  to  represent,  with  Hume,  the  relation  of 
cause  and  effect  as  being  mainly  or  essentially  that  of  in- 
variable antecedence  and  consequence.  Most  people  have 
felt  this  doctrine  to  be  meagre  and  unsatisfactory,  without 
being  able  to  correct  it  by  supplying  the  felt  deficiency.  It 
is  not  the  invariable  sequence  which  constitutes  causation; 
there  must  be  something  in  causation  which  produces  the 
invariable  succession,  otherwise,  why  should  the  sequence 
be  so  invariable  ?  The  certainty  in  the  succession  is  pro- 
duced by  the  power  acting  in  the  causes.  Causation  is 
thus  seen  to  be  in  the  very  nature  of  the  bodies  acting  as 
the  causes. 

9.  We  see  and  can  explain  what  is  meant  by  the  con- 
tinuity of  nature  which  was  noticed  by  observers  from  an 
early  date,  and  which  has  been  speculated  on  by  many 
profound  thinkers  such  as  Leibnitz.     When  w^e  look  care- 


18  PHYSICAL    CAUSATION. 

fully  into  the  operation  of  tlie  material  world  we  discover 
that  there  is  no  break  in  its  successive  actings.  True,  there 
is  often  no  causal  connection  between  one  state  of  things 
and  another  going  immediately  before,  between,  for  ex- 
ample, night  and  day,  which  do  not  produce  each  other 
while  they  are  invariable  antecedents  and  consequents.  But 
when  we  go  behind  the  more  obvious  appearances,  we  find 
that  each  is  produced  by  antecedent  causes ;  the  day  by 
the  shining  of  the  sun  and  the  night  by  his  withdrawal. 
If  we  trace  any  occurrence  backward  we  find  it  preceded 
by  a  series  of  antecedents,  and  if  we  go  on  with  it  we  have 
connected  consequents.  Causation  is  a  bundle  of  twisted 
chains  each  of  which  follows  its  own  course,  but  which  are 
all  joined  in  a  connected  machine.  This  it  is  which  at  the 
bottom  produces  the  continuity  of  nature,  which,  however, 
is  always  gathering  adjuncts  to  enable  it  to  proceed. 

10.  Among  these  scattering  forces  there  is  need  of  a 
regulating  power  to  produce  order  and  beneficence.  With- 
out this  the  powers  might  w^ork  irregularly  and  injuriously, 
and  bring  forth  only  evil  agents,  such  as  flaming  meteors 
and  burning  worlds,  pestiferous  creatures  devouring  one 
another,  as  gnats,  serpents,  wild  beasts,  arresting  all  forms 
of  beauty  and  means  of  happiness,  and  yet  incapable  of 
annihilation.  We  find  instead  millions  of  agencies  com- 
bining to  accomplish  good  and  benign  ends.  Take  the  ear. 
A  sister  utters  a  word,  a  vibration  is  started,  it  reaches  our 
ear,  is  collected  by  the  outer  surface  and  knocks  on  the 
tympanum,  is  propagated  into  the  middle  ear,  whence  it 
sets  in  motion  the  hammer,  the  anvil,  and  the  stirrup, 
thence  it  penetrates  into  the  inner  ear,  where  it  vibrates 
through  a  liquid,  affects  the  thousand  and  more  organs  of 
corti,  is  sent  round  the  semicircular  canals  into  the  cochlea, 
and  along  the  auditory  nerve  into  the  brain ;  the  silence  is 
broken,  and  we  are  cheered  by  a  voice  of  love. 


SECTION  II. 

PSYCHICAL   CAUSATION. 

I  HAVE  spoken  of  causation  in  physical  nature.  I  am 
now  to  speak  of  it  in  psychical  action. 

The  conservation  of  energy  may  be  regarded  as  an  es- 
tablished doctrine.  Savans  do  indeed  continue  to  assert 
that  some  of  the  most  eminent  among  themselves  do  not 
understand  it,  or  have  not  expressed  it  properly,  or  have 
illegitimately  applied  it.  But  it  is  universally  admitted 
that  the  doctrine  is  a  true  and  all-important  one. 

But  let  us  properly  understand  and  explain  it,  and  keep 
it  within  its  proper  limits.  It  will  be  admitted  by  all  at 
once  that  we  are  not  entitled  to  alRrm  that  the  law  extends 
beyond  our  cosmos  or  knowable  universe.  For  anything 
we  know  there  may  be  other  worlds  beyond  ours,  and  we 
have  no  right  to  say  that  in  these  worlds  there  is  only  a 
definite  amount  of  energy  which  cannot  be  increased  or 
diminished.  God  may,  or  ma}^  not,  be  creating  suns  or 
earths  or  living  beings  beyond  our  ken,  and  altogether  be- 
yond our  science.  The  doctrine  of  the  conservation  of  en- 
ergy, as  I  understand,  holds  only  on  the  supposition  that  our 
cosmos  is  like  a  closed  globe.  It  is  conceivable  that  our 
world  may  not  be  so  closed  in ;  that  the  dissipated  heat 
which  is  passing  into  space  may  travel  into  other  worlds 
and  influence  them  without  our  being  able  to  notice  it. 

This  restriction  of  the  doctrine  is  so  obvious  that  it  is 
scarcely  worth  noticing  it.  But  there  are  other  limitations 
which  it  is  of  vast  moment  to  bi'ing  into  prominence,  as 
they  are  being  overlooked  by  some  of  our  scientific  men. 
There  is  clear  evidence  that  there  are  other  potences  or 


20  PSYCHICAL   CAUSATIOl^. 

powers  in  nature  besides  the  mechanical  or  physical  forces. 
It  is  not  proven  that  the  doctrine  of  the  conservation  of 
energy  applies  to  these. 

Take  Life.  So  far  as  I  understand  him,  Herbert  Spen- 
cer seems  inclined  to  hold  that  the  doctrine  applies  to  all 
the  powers  in  the  world,  even  to  the  vital  and  mental ;  in- 
deed, he  seems  incapable  of  distinguishing  between  nerve 
force  and  mental  force.  But  he  brings  no  proof  that  phy- 
sical force  and  psychical  force  can  be  transmuted  into  each 
other.  The  language  of  most  of  our  scientific  speculators 
is  hesitating.  Huxley  and  Tyndall  resolutely  maintain 
that  there  is  no  proof  that  living  beings  can  proceed  from 
non-living.  Darwin  calls  in  three  or  four  live  germs, 
which  he  ascribes  to  God,  before  he  can  account  for  the 
development  of  vegetable  and  animal  life.  I  have  ob- 
served that  those  who  reject  a  separate  life  or  vital  force 
are  obliged  to  bring  it  in  under  another  form.  Thus  Dai-- 
win  calls  in  a  pangenesis  pervading  organic  nature,  and 
Spencer  has  physiological  units  wdiicli  play  an  important 
part  in  generation  and  heredity,  and  these  are  certainly 
vital  forces.  Then  the  argmnents  and  experiments  of 
Beale  have  to  be  met,  and  they  have  not  yet  been  met  by 
those  who  would  deny  the  existence  of  a  vital  potency  of 
some  kind  different  from  mechanical  force. 

But  there  are  other  agents  in  our  v\'orld  more  clearly 
distinguished  from  the  physical  forces  than  the  vital  pow- 
ers are.  I  refer  to  the  psychical  or  mental ;  to  those  of 
which  we  are  conscious,  wliich  in  fact  we  know  innnedi- 
ately ;  such  as  our  sense  perceptions,  our  memories,  our 
judgments,  our  reasonings,  our  desires,  our  emotions,  our 
resolves.  These  we  know  as  directly  and  clearly  as  we 
know  the  affections  of  body,  such  as  extension  and  resist- 
ance, and  we  have  quite  as  good  evidence  of  the  existence 
of  the  one  as  of  the  other.     Are  these  mental  powers  to  be 


DIFFEREKT  FROM   PHYSICAL.  21 

included  in  the  physical  forces  which  can  neither  be  in- 
creased nor  diminished  ?  Can  the  physical  forces  be  trans- 
muted into  the  mental,  say  the  mechanical,  or  the  chemical 
into  thoughts,  inclinations,  and  volitions?  ]N"early  every 
scientific  man  in  the  present  day  admits,  nay,  maintains, 
that  there  is  no  proof  of  this.  Many  affirm  that  they 
cannot  even  conceive  it  to  be  so.  Tyndall,  no  doubt,  in 
his  Belfast  address  hastened  on  to  a  high  vaporous  gen- 
eralization, and  declared  that  it  looked  as  if  all  things 
could  be  brought  under  the  potency  of  matter;  in  the  , 
mean  time  declaring,  however,  that  he  could  not  conceive  / 
how  matter  could  affect  mind,  or  mind  matter.  Mr.  Fiske 
talks  of  our  now  needing  to  assume  only  one  universal  as- 
sumption, "  the  principle  of  continuity,  the  uniformity  of 
nature,  the  persistence  of  force,  or  the  law  of  causation  ;" 
but  then  he  is  obliged  to  add  that  "  in  no  scientific  sense  is 
thought  the  product  of  molecular  movement,  and  that  the 
progress  of  modern  discovery  (correlation),  so  far  from 
bridging  over  the  chasm  between  mind  and  matter,  tends 
rather  to  exhibit  the  distinction  between  them  as  abso- 
lute." The  contradiction  is  here  evident,  and  has  been 
pointed  out  by  scientific  men ;  but  I  need  not  dwell  upon 
it,  my  object  being  simply  to  show  that  thoughts  and  men- 
tal affections  have  not  yet  been  reduced  to  physical  forces. 
;N"o  doubt  mind  and  body  do  so  far  affect  each  other. 
If  a  person  is  told  that  his  dearest  friend  has  died  sud- 
denly, his  pulse  will  be  apt  to  rise.  Prof.  Barker  attaches 
a  great  importance  to  an  experiment  of  a  person  first  read- 
ing easy  English,  when  his  pulse  was  not  affected,  then 
reading  Greek,  when  it  rose  several  degrees.  Such  cases, 
and  they  might  be  multiplied  indefinitely,  show  that  men- 
tal thoughts  and  feelings  do  affect  the  brain-action,  but 
they  do  not  show  that  they  add  to  or  diminish  the  physical 
forces  in  the  brain,  or  that  the  mental  feeling  or  thought 


22  PSYCHICAL  causatio:n". 

has  been  trausinuted  into  a  movement  of  the  pulse.  A  man 
standing  by  a  stream  pushes  a  big  stone  in  the  water  aside 
and  the  stream  flows  a  little  more  rapidly  for  a  minute  or 
two ;  but  he  has  not  thereby  added  to  the  quantity  of 
water.  Just  as  little  does  mental  action,  reasoning  or  feel- 
ing, add  to  or  diminish  the  amount  of  physical  force  in  the 
cerebro-spinal  mass. 

There  is  no  evidence,  but  the  very  opposite,  that  our 
mental  actions  are  identical  or  correlative  with  bodily  mo- 
tions or  activities  of  any  kind.  Take  as  example,  the  dis- 
coveries of  science,  the  reasonings  of  mathematicians,  the 
visions  of  poets,  the  penetration  of  such  philosophers  as 
Aristotle,  the  ardor  of  the  patriot,  the  beatific  vision  of  the 
Christian,  the  saci'ifices  made  by  the  poor  for  honor  and 
honesty's  sake.  What  savant  will  estimate  for  us  in  quan- 
titative expressions  of  physics  or  chemistry,  the  depth  of 
affection  in  the  mother's  bosom  when  she  incurs  death  her- 
self to  save  her  son,  or  the  height  of  genius  reached  by 
Shakespeare  when  he  conceived  Hamlet  or  Lady  Macbeth  ? 
There  is  no  one  proper  quality  of  matter,  such  as  the  oc- 
cupation of  space,  or  resistance,  or  elasticity,  that  can  be 
predicated  of  thoughts  or  affections.  There  is  no  one 
quality  of  mind,  such  as  perception,  thought,  reasoning,  or 
love,  that  can  be  applied  to  this  table  or  that  chair.  The 
instrument  has  not  yet  been  invented  that  can  weigh  or 
measure  our  intellectual  or  voluntary  operations.  When  a 
tree  dies  it  carries  into  the  ground  not  only  the  particles  of 
matter  which  composed  it,  but  the  forces  in  the  tree  to  add 
to  the  forces  in  the  ground.  It  is  the  same  with  the  body 
of  brute  or  of  man  when  it  is  buried,  it  carries  wdth  it 
into  the  grave  all  the  physical  forces  ;  but  were  there  any 
new  physical  forces  added  to  the  earth  when  Plato,  Milton, 
Bacon,  or  [N^ewton  died  ? 

It  thus  appears  that  in  the  very  midst  of  the  physical 


CAUSE   AND   EFFECT   IN   MIND.  23 

forces  and  their  correlations  there  may  be  other  operations, 
mental  or  spiritual,  and  against  this  science  has  and  can 
have  nothing  to  say.  I  mean  to  refer  to  these  farther  on 
in  the  paper. 

It  is  generally  believed  and  acknowledged  that  there  is 
cause  and  effect  in  mind  as  well  as  in  body.  In  the  one 
as  in  the  other,  we  expect  the  same  antecedents  to  be  fol- 
lowed by  the  same  consequents.  When  we  wish  to  secure  in 
ourselves  or  others,  say  in  the  yonng,  a  certain  disposition  or 
habit  of  patience  and  perseverance,  we  set  agoing  a  train- 
ing or  discipline  fitted  to  produce  the  result.  When  we 
are  anxious  to  gain  the  good  wdll  of  our  neighbors,  we  ad- 
dress the  motives  most  likely  to  sway  them.  The  orator 
seeks  i:o  convince  and  move  to  action  by  arguments  and 
considerations  likely  to  influence  his  audience.  In  knowing 
a  man's  propensities,  we  can  at  times  predict  the  part  he  will 
take  in  certain  circumstances,  and  so  far  as  we  cannot  do 
this  fully,  or  accurately,  it  is  simply  because  we  are  not 
fully  acquainted  with  all  the  elements  in  his  character ;  just 
as  in  physical  nature  we  often  cannot  foresee  the  events 
that  are  to  occur,  because  the  powers  operating  are  so 
numerous  and  complicated.  There  are  some  men  of  whom 
we  are  sure  that  they  will  not  do  a  mean  act.  In  many 
cases  we  can  determine  what  a  man's  springs  of  action  are 
by  his  acts  ;  we  are  sure  he  is  swayed  by  passion  or  malig- 
nity, by  honor  or  by  charity. 

It  is  clear  that  there  is  Power  in  the  mind — I  use  the 
word  power,  leaving  the  phrase  energy  to  be  applied  by 
the  physicists  to  the  action  of  body.  All  writers  who  have 
had  occasion  to  refer  to  the  operations  of  the  mind,  have 
spoken  of  its  powers  or  faculties,  classifying  them  in  va- 
rious w^ays,  as  into  the  Gnoctic  or  Gnostic  and  the  Crea- 
tive with  Aristotle,  translated  into  Latin  the  Cognitive  or 
Motive,  or  the  Understanding  and  the  Will,  the  Intellect 


24  PSYCHICAL    CAUSATION. 

and  the  Feelings  ;  and  tliej  have  spoken  severally  of  the 
Senses,  the  Memory,  the  Imagination,  the  Reason,  the 
Conscience,  the  Emotions,  and  Volitions.  They  have  re- 
garded all  of  these  as  having  an  influence,  and  capable  of 
producing  an  effect. 

It  is  not  easy  to  determine  pi-ecisely  the  nature  of  men- 
tal effectuation.  We  are  not  able  to  measure  psychical  as 
we  do  physical  energy,  in  foot  pounds.  It  might  indeed  be 
argued  that,  as  being  immediately  conscious  of  it,  we  do, 
in  fact,  know  as  nmch  in  a  general  way  of  mental  as  we 
do  of  bodily  production  ;  but  we  are  not  able  to  put  it  in 
quantitative  form. 

This  power  manifests  itself  in  two  ways.  There  is  the 
power  of  the  Mind  over  the  Body,  with  the  corresponding 
capacity  of  the  Body  to  produce  an  impression  on  the 
Mind.  For  upwards  of  2,000  years,  philosophers  held, 
generally,  by  the  principle  of  Empedocles,  the  Sicilian 
philosopher,  that  like  can  only  influence  like,  and  they 
denied  that  mind  could  influence  body,  or  body  mind, 
and  this  opinion  still  lingers  among  metaphysicians.  I 
deny  the  principle  that  like  can  only  sway  like,  and  I  can 
see  no  difiiculty  in  allowing  that  psychical  action  may  pro- 
duce physical  action,  say  action  of  the  nerves,  and  vice 
versa.  It  certainly  seems  to  do  so.  I  will  to  move  my  arm, 
and  there  is  action  in  the  gray  cellular  matter  of  the  pe- 
riphery of  the  brain,  which  proceeds  down  the  transmis- 
sive  white  matter  to  a  basal  nerve  w^hich  moves  the  mus- 
cles and  the  bones,  and  the  intended  effect  is  produced. 
There  seems  to  be  a  causal  action  throughout  this  process ; 
an  action  of  the  mind  on  the  brain,  and  of  the  brain  on 
the  nerves.  There  is  a  like  phenomenon  in  the  feelings 
producing  an  effect  on  the  oi'ganism,  as  when  a  ludicrous 
idea  leads  to  laughter,  and  grief  bursts  out  in  tears,  and  a 
sense  of  kindness  received   covers  the  face  with  smiles. 


MUTUAL   ACTION    OF   31IND   AND   BODY.  25 

Even  intellectual  exercises  seem  to  have  an  effect  on  the 
brain,  as  exhaustion  is  felt  when  thej  are  prolonged. 

There  is  also  an  influence  of  the  body  on  the  mind,  as 
when  the  bodilj  senses  produce  a  mental  perception,  say 
of  a  form  or  a  color,  and  a  healthy  organism  raises  up 
pleasant  feelings,  or  a  diseased  stomach  or  liver  raises  up 
gloomy  thoughts.  In  all  these  cases  there  is  a  power  pro- 
ducing certain  defined  effects.  It  may  be  argued  that  the 
effects  follow  not  directly,  but  by  some  agency  commonly 
supposed  to  be  unknown.  There  is  a  constant  inquiry  into 
the  how  in  the  relation  betw^een  mind  and  body,  usually 
followed  by  the  acknowledgment  that  it  is  a  mystery.  At 
this  point  it  may  at  once  be  allowed  that  in  the  nuitual  ac- 
tion of  mind  and  body  there  are  processes  unknown  to  us. 
Xo  one  will  maintain  that  the  physiologist  can  as  yet  spe- 
cify all  the  steps  involved  in  the  process  by  which  an  ex- 
ternal object  reaches  the  perceiving  mind.  But  suppose  he 
is  able  to  do  so,  it  does  not  appear  to  me  that  the  mys- 
tery would  thereby  be  diminished.  In  tracing  back  the 
nervous  and  the  cerebral  action,  we  come  at  last  to  a  point 
or  line  where  the  body  acts  on  the  mind.  The  only  way  of 
avoiding  this  conclusion  is  by  calling  in  some  sort  of  ter- 
tium  quid  in  the  shape  say  of  a  plastic  medium,  which  com- 
municates between  mind  and  body.  The  difficulty  is  not 
thereby  removed,  it  is  not  even  lessened  ;  for,  if  it  is  of  the 
nature  of  either  body  or  mind,  we  have  still  to  show  how 
it  acts  on  mind  if  it  is  body,  and  how  it  acts  on  body  if  it 
is  mind.  If  it  is  of  the  nature,  neither  of  body  nor  mind, 
it  is  an  unwarranted  hypothesis,  explaining  nothing,  and 
multiplying  the  difficulties,  for  we  have  now  to  explain  how 
in  one  case  bod}^  acts  on  the  medium,  and  the  medium  on 
mind,  and  how  in  the  other  case  mind  acts  on  the  medium 
and  the  medium  on  bod}''.  The  simplest,  and  on  the  whole 
the  most  reasonable  supposition,  is  that  mind  has  a  potency 


26  PSYCHICAL   CAUSATION. 

whereby  it  acts  on  body,  and  body  a  potency  whereby  it 
acts  on  mind.  This  is  far  more  likely  than  the  Male- 
branche's  hypothesis  of  occasional  cause,  or  that  of  pre-es- 
tablished harmony  by  Leibnitz.  Sooner  or  later,  we  may  be 
able  to  determine  precisely  the  nature  of  the  action,  that 
is,  in  what  circumstances  it  acts,  how  far  it  extends,  and 
how  it  is  limited.  This  is  all  we  can  know  about  any  law 
of  nature,  and  when  this  is  accomplished  there  is  no  more 
mystery  than  in  the  law  of  the  mutual  attraction  of  mat- 
ter, or  in  that  of  chemical  affinity. 

But  very  nice  questions  are  here  started,  and  to  these 
we  can  give  little  more  than  negative  answers,  fitted  to  re- 
move erroneous  impressions.  Is  there  any  such  relation  in 
the  nuitual  action  of  psychical  and  physical  action  as  is  im- 
plied in  the  conservation  of  material  energy  ?  When  the  body 
acts  on  mind,  does  the  energy  in  matter  go  into  mind,  and 
appear  in  a  new  form  ?  Or  when  mind  acts  on  body,  is 
there  new  energy  entering  matter?  I  answer  unhesita- 
tingly that  there  is  no  proof  of  this  whatever.  On  the 
contrary,  every  thing  goes  on  in  the  body  according  to  the 
laws  or  properties  of  body,  and  every  thing  in  the  mind 
according  to  the  nature  of  mind.  Our  volitions  and  other 
mental  acts  may  give  a  new  direction  to  the  forces  in  the 
bodies,  but  they  do  not  add  to  them  or  increase  them.  Our 
will  moves  the  arm  which  was  before  at  rest,  but  it  only 
calls  into  activity  the  potential  energy  already  there,  and 
that  energy  acts  according  to  its  nature.  The  senses  make 
known  an  object  to  us,  but  it  does  not  add  any  new  mental 
power,  and  the  object  being  there,  or  rather  being  known 
there,  calls  forth  ideas  or  feelings  according  to  the  mental 
laws  of  association.  In  the  body  every  thing  proceeds  ac- 
cording to  physiological  laws ;  and  in  the  mind  according 
to  psychical  laws. 

In  all  such  causation  there  is  at  least  a  duality  in  the 


POWERS.  IN   THE   MIND.  27 

cause,  both  a  physiological  and  a  psychical :  these  together 
constitute  tlie  cause  without  which  the  effect  would  not 
follow.  There  is  a  like  duplicity  in  the  effects,  both  body 
and  mind  are  changed. 

Secondly,  there  is  causation  operating  in  the  mind  itself. 
By  the  will  and  other  psychical  acts  we  can  influence  not 
only  the  body,  but  the  state  of  the  mind.  "We  can  detain 
the  present  idea,  and  bi'ing  up  thereby  a  succession  of  as- 
sociations pleasant  or  unpleasant :  profitable,  as  when  we 
contemplate  a  high  exemplar,  or  cherish  a  good  resolution  ; 
or  noxious,  as  we  cherish  revenge  or  lust.  There  are  cer- 
tain states  of  mind  wdiich  follow  necessarily  from  certain 
others.  The  idea  of  a  friend  in  distress  raises  grief,  of  an 
acceptable  gift  raises  gladness. 

I  am  not  sure  that  we  can  express  accurately  the  natui-e 
of  psychical  causation,  yet  we  can  say  much  about  it.  We 
know  so  far  the  limits  of  the  several  faculties.  We  know 
much  of  the  power  of  sense  perception,  as  that  it  reveals 
objects  external  to  us ;  that  we  do  not  know  distance  di- 
rectly by  the  eye,  that  we  cannot  have  any  idea  of  a  color  or 
odor  that  has  not  been  made  known  by  a  special  inlet, — the 
man  born  blind  has  no  conception  of  color.  We  have  ascer- 
tained as  to  memory,  that  it  remembers  whatever  was  vivid 
in  the  original  impression.  The  imagination  can  bring  up 
in  new  forms  and  dispositions  only  what  we  have  previously 
experienced.  We  can  reason  only  when  we  use  a  middle 
term  to  combine  the  two  terms  whose  relation  ^\e  do  not 
know.  Emotion  springs  up  only  when  w^e  have  an  appre- 
hension of  something  good  or  evil.  Conscience  approves 
of  certain  acts,  and  condenms  others.  We  cannot  express 
these  powers  quantitatively,  as  we  do  those  of  gravity  and 
chemical  affinity.  We  cannot  number  or  measure  them  as 
w^e  do  the  physical  forces.  Still  we  can  notice  their  extent 
and  their  boundaries.    Psychology  is  doing  its  proper  work 


28  PSYCHICAL   CAUSATION. 

when,  with  consciousness  as  its  agent  of  observation,  it  is 
finding  ont  the  powers  of  the  mind  and  their  functions. 

In  inquiring  more  specifically  into  the  nature  of  psychi- 
cal causation  we  find  that,  while  in  one  sense  it  is  simple, 
in  another  sense  it  is  complex.  We  have  seen  that  there 
is  a  duality  or  plurality  in  all  physical  production,  both  in 
the  cause  and  in  the  effect.  We  have  seen  that  there  is 
duality  or  plurality  in  the  action  of  mind  on  body  and  body 
on  mind.  There  is  a  like  complexity  or  plurality  in  purely 
psychical  action,  both  in  the  cause  and  in  the  effect.  What 
is  the  cause  of  this  reproach  of  conscience  which  we  feel 
after  committing  an  evil  deed  ?  An  essential  part  of  it  is 
no  doubt  the  immediately  state,  the  idea  of  the  deed.  But 
this  is  not  all.  Acting  with  this  there  is  a  native  moral 
power,  a  power  of  conscience.  It  is  only  when  there  is 
joint  action  that  the  deed  is  condemned.  The  mere  image 
or  conception  of  the  deed  will  not  call  forth  the  reproach  ; 
nor,  on  the  other  hand,  will  the  moral  power  act  unless 
there  be  an  apprehension  of  the  deed :  the  effect  is  pro- 
duced by  the  union  of  the  two.  So  it  is  in  all  cases.  When 
the  mother  grieves  over  the  death  of  her  son,  there  is 
more  than  the  conception  of  the  event ;  there  is  the  deep 
affection  which  she  cherished  towards  him. 

We  have  seen,  that  in  physical  causation,  there  is  always 
something  abiding.  Aristotle  had  a  material,  as  well  as  an 
efficient  cause.  It  is  the  same  7imitatis  mutandis  in  psy- 
chical action.  In  all  material  action  there  is  a  body  as  a 
substance,  and  in  all  mental  action  there  is  mind  as  a 
substance  ;  both  being  permanent.  This  is  a  truth  never 
seen  or  acknowledged  by  Mr.  John  S.  Mill,  who  defined 
mind  as  "  a  series  of  feelings  aware  of  itself,"  whereas  it 
is  an  abiding  existence  with  a  series  of  feelings.  He  de- 
fined body  as  "a  permanent  possibility  of  sensations," 
whereas  it  is  a  permanent  thing,  ever  ready  to  produce 
sensations  within  our  minds.      The  present  state  of  the 


IMPLIES   THE   SOUL   ACTING.  29 

soul  is  always  the  necessary  effect  of  the  immediately  pre- 
ceding one.  But  in  that  preceding  state,  and  I  may  add 
in  the  present  one,  there  is  the  mind  itself  with  its  capaci- 
ties abiding.  The  canse  of  every  given  thought  and  feeling 
is  thus  a  complex  one,  made  up  of  some  previous  thought 
or  feeling,  but  also  of  the  mind  thinking  and  feeling. 

The  portrait  suggests  the  original.  Is  the  portrait,  or 
the  perception  of  it,  the  cause  of  the  thought  of  the  per- 
son painted  ?  I  do  not  regard  this  as  a  full  account  of  the 
cause.  The  portrait  may  be  seen  by  one  w^he  never  saw 
the  original,  and  to  him  there  is  no  such  suggestion.  The 
true  cause  embraces  the  sight  of  the  portrait,  but  there  is 
also  involved  in  it  the  mind  with  its  knowledge  of  the  per- 
son painted,  and  also  the  principle  that  like  suggests  like. 
AYhen  two  premises  are  before  the  mind,  they  necessitate 
a  conclusion,  as  when  we  have  it  allowed  that  "  all  men 
have  a  conscience,"  and  that  "the  Indian  is  a  man,"  we 
conclude  that  "  he  has  a  conscience."  Are  the  two  pre- 
mises the  cause  of  the  conclusion  ?  I  believe  they  are  not 
to  be  so  regarded.  The  act  taken  by  itself  is  to  be  regarded 
as  one  of  judgment,  and  not  causation.  In  the  cause  there 
are  not  only  the  premises,  but  the  laws  of  the  mind,  or 
rather  the  mind  with  its  laws,  that  is,  the  law^s  of  rea- 
soning, especially  the  dictum  of  Aristotle,  that  whatever 
is  true  of  a  class  is  true  of  all  the  members  of  the  class. 
Every  thought,  every  feeling,  I  may  add  every  resolution, 
is  thus  the  result  of  the  state  of  the  mind  with  its  proper- 
ties, and  of  the  innnediately  preceding  thought  or  feeling, 
which  might  be  called  the  occasion.  It  thus  appears  that 
the  web  of  causation  is  quite  as  complicated  in  psychical 
as  in  physical  nature. 

I  am  unwilling,  in  this  paper,  to  enter  into  the  con- 
flict of  ages  as  to  whether  there  is  causation  in  acts  of  the 
will.  I  am  prepared  to  argue  that  there  is.  On  the  other 
hand,  I  hold  resolutely  that  there  is  a  sense  in  which  the 


30  PSYCHICAL   CAUSATION. 

will  is  free.  Holding  by  both  these  truths,  as  I  reckon 
them,  I  am  obliged  to  add  that  I  cannot  remove  all  the 
ditficnlties  in  which  I  am  thus  involved.  It  is  asked,  how 
can  there  be  free  will,  which  I  resohitely  hold,  if  our  vo- 
litions are  after  determined  by  something  out  of  them- 
selves, and  above  themselves  ?  I  do  not  profess  to  be  able 
thoroughly  to  clear  up  this  subject ;  but  the  view  of  causa- 
tion which  has  been  set  forth  in  this  ti'eatise  is  fitted,  I 
reckon,  to  lessen,  if  not  to  remove,  some  of  the  difficulties. 
We  have  seen  that  there  may  be  different  kinds  of  causa- 
tion. The  causes  that  act  on  the  will  are  certainly  not 
mechanical  or  physical,  like  those  which  compel  a  body 
to  move  in  a  particular  wa}'.  A  man's  volitions  are  not 
swayed  altogether,  or  even  mainly,  by  the  same  circum- 
stances ;  for  two  men  will  act  differently  in  like  circum- 
stances, and  this  evidently-  owing  to  the  dilterence  of  their 
character.  We  have  seen  that  there  are  causes  operating 
within  the  mind  itself.  Those  that  finally  sway  and  de- 
termine the  will  lie  within.  If  we  properly  understand  the 
language,  I  believe  we  may  admit  that  in  every  particular 
act  the  mind  is  swayed  by  motives,  but  the  motives  are  to 
be  found,  not  out  of  the  mind,  but  in  the  mind,  nay, 
largely  in  the  will  itself.  The  causes  which  sway  the  will 
are  mainly  in  our  nature  and  character,  in  our  dispositions 
and  habits  which  our  own  wills  have  been  forming.  It  is 
certain  that  this  man  will  yield  to  the  temptation,  and  be 
guilty  of  excessive  drinking  in  a  particular  company,  but 
it  is  because  of  habits  which  he  has  indulged  in  for  years. 
It  is  certain  that  this  other  man  will  act  honorably  in  a  cer- 
tain trying  position,  but  then  it  is  because  he  is  guided  by 
right  principles,  and  by  an  upright  character.  I  do  not 
say  that  this  doctrine  delivers  us  from  all  difficulties,  but 
it  helps  to  relieve  us  from  the  oppression  which  we  feel 
when  we  are  told  that  our  whole  acts  are  under  a  law  of 
stern  necessity  which  allows  no  liberty. 


SECTION  III. 

CAUSATION   SUBJECTH-E. 

The  above  is  all  I  am  able  to  saj  as  to  the  nature  of 
cause.  I  do  not  claim  to  have  removed  all  difficulties. 
I  am  satisfied  if  I  have  corrected  some  erroneous  notions 
and  shed  some  light  on  important  points.  I  am  now  to 
turn  to  the  other  side  of  my  subject,  to  the  mental  process 
involved  in  our  conviction  as  to  the  relation  between  cause 
and  effect.  Even  as  causation  objective  pervades  all  nature, 
so  causation  subjective  runs  as  a  binding  power  through 
the  great  body  of  our  mental  exercises. 

We  may  allow  physicists  to  use  the  word  energy  for  the 
activities  of  mattei*.  But  there  is  activity  in  mind  as  well 
as  matter  and  it  is  needful  to  have  a  word  to  express  both. 
The  word  Povv^er  may  be  used  for  this  purpose. 

There  are  two  special  ways  in  which  we  come  to  know 
power.  The  one  is  by  the  muscular  sense.  AVe  move  a 
muscle,  and  we  find  it  resisted  by  the  objects  it  meets  with. 
We  experience  this  in  the  first  exercise  of  our  muscular 
activity  and  in  every  succeeding  one.  There  is  resistance 
offered  not  only  by  that  table,  but  by  the  air  as  the  arm 
passes  through  it.  Science  finds  it  necessary  to  maintain 
that  the  very  ether  has  been  offering  resistance  to  the  pas- 
sage through  it  of  the  comet  of  Encke.  The  other  is  by 
the  exercise  of  our  voluntary  power.  Our  volitions  pro- 
duce changes  directly  or  indirectly  over  our  bodies  of  which 
we  are  sensible.  We  will  to  move  the  arm,  and  it  moves. 
Our  will  also  produces  changes  on  the  states  of  om*  mind. 


32  CAUSATIOJ!T    SUBJECTIVE. 

"We  will  to  detain  a  present  thought,  and  it  keeps  with  ns 
as  long  as  we  will,  thereby  resisting  the  ordinary  flow  of 
association. 

I  believe  that  both  these  potencies  have  a  wider  exten- 
sion than  is  commonly  supposed.  I  have  at  times  thought 
that  there  may  be  power  discerned,  as  it  is  certainly  in- 
volved, in  the  exercise  of  all  the  senses.  In  the  vibrations 
which  enter  the  ear,  in  the  rays  of  light  that  fall  upon  the 
eye,  in  the  odors  that  reach  the  nostrils,  in  the  liquid  which 
affect  the  palate,  there  is  a  mutual  action  dully  felt  of  the 
touching  bodies  and  of  the  organism.  It  might  be  argued,  I 
think,  that  in  all  these  ways  we  get  an  apprehension  of 
bodies  as  having  power,  just  as  it  is  now  generally  ack- 
nowledged we  have  a  knowledge  by  all  the  senses  of  bodies 
as  having  extension.  We  know  our  nostrils  and  palate  as 
having  a  certain  direction  which  must  be  in  space,  so  we 
seem  to  know  these  same  nostrils  as  affected,  which  implies 
power. 

I  am  farther  sure  that  volitions  are  constantly  minghng 
with  our  mental  operations.  A  sensation  is  agreeable  and 
w^e  detain  it,  or  it  is  disagreeable  and  we  banish  it  or  escape 
from  it,  and  in  all  such  processes  we  use  causation.  There 
is  an  exercise  of  will  implied  in  the  regulation  of  our 
thoughts,  otherwise  they  would  run  wild  as  in  our  dreams. 
In  making  ourselves  acquainted  with  any  subject  we  have 
to  attend  to  it,  and  attention  is  an  act  of  the  will.  In  read- 
ing a  book  and  in  listening  to  a  discourse  we  have  to  keep 
our  thoughts  from  wandering,  which  they  would  be  sure  to 
do  if  they  were  allowed  to  follow  merely  the  laws  of  in- 
voluntary association.  We  have  to  order  our  thoughts 
when  w^e  are  conversing  with  our  fellow  men,  and  when 
we  are  writing  intelligently.  The  orator  has  to  give  his 
thoughts  a  direction  all  toward  a  point,  when  he  is  seeking 
to  arouse  and  persuade.     The  mathematician,  and  indeed. 


INVOLVED   IN   KNOWLEDGE   OF  THINGS.  33 

every  one  who  reasons  closely,  has  to  restrain  and  guide 
his  ideas  and  his  judgments.  Some  have  supposed  that 
one  difference  between  our  waking  thoughts  and  our  dreams 
lies  in  the  will  having  lost  its  control  in  the  latter,  mainly 
owing,  it  may  be,  to  tlie  weariness  of  the  organism,  indis- 
posing us  to  farther  exertion  till  the  pool  which  had  run 
out  is  again  filled.  Causation  has  thus  a  place  in  the 
greater  number  of  our  thinking  operations.  We  exercise 
power  in  every  volition,  but  volition  is  constantly  interpos- 
ing to  direct  our  thoughts. 

Causation  has  a  place  in  the  very  steps  by  which  we  ob- 
tain our  knowledge  of  things.  It  is  involved  in  the  very 
means  by  which  we  acquire  our  knowledge  of  external 
objects.  We  know  them  as  affecting  us,  that  is,  having 
power  over  us.  It  is  much  the  same  with  all  the  knowl- 
edge acquired  by  us.  The  things  have  been  made  known  by 
their  having  power  over  us,  or  some  other  thing,  by  which 
they  are  made  known  to  us.'  It  is  a  common  saying  that 
we  know  things  by  their  properties,  but  what  are  proper- 
ties but  powers  ?  It  is  not  by  induction,  that  is,  a  gathered 
experience,  that  we  know  things  as  having  power ;  we  know 
this  in  our  primary  experience,  and  in  all  subsequent  ex- 
periences. Power  is  thus  involved  in  things  as  known  to 
us.     We  cannot  think  of  them  except  as  having  powei'S. 

It  will  now  be  seen  how  I  would  settle  the  question 
which  has  been  the  leading  philosophic  one  since  the  days 
of  David  Hume,  as  to  wdiether  our  conviction  as  to  cause 
and  effect  is  a  priori  or  a  posteriori,  to  use  the  phraseology 
of  Kant,  or,  to  employ  more  unexceptionable  terms,  arises 
at  once  from  our  looking  at  things,  or  is  the  reasoned  result 
of  a  gathered  observation.    It  is  certainly  experiential,  as  all 

'  "  We  are  obliged,"  says  Herbert  Spencer  in  his  First  Principles,  "to 
regard  every  phenomenon  as  a  manifestation  of  some  Power  by  which 
we  are  acted  upon."     Let  Ixim  follow  out  this. 
2* 


34  CAUSATION   SUBJECTIVE. 

our  knowledges  and  beliefs  are  in  the  consciousness  of  the 
mind,  but  it  is  not  experiential  in  the  sense  of  needing  in- 
duction and  reasoning.  It  is  intuitive  in  that  we  pei-ceive 
it  to  be  in  the  very  nature  of  the  thing.  It  can  stand  the 
tests  of  intuition,  as  these  have  been  enunciated  in  tlie 
paper  on  the  Criteria  of  Truth.  We  perceive  objects  di- 
rectly as  having  power  and  acting  causally.  It  comes  in 
consequence  to  be  necessary ;  we  cannot  believe  it  to  be 
otherwise.  We  cannot  be  made  to  believe  that  there  is  an 
event  without  a  cause,  or  a  causal  relation  without  a  defi- 
nite action  being  ready  to  follow.  It  is,  thirdly,  universal 
in  that  all  men  have  the  conviction. 

Xot  that  this  is  done  without  the  competent  and  appropri- 
ate mental  capacity,  but  this  is  neither  less  nor  more  than  the 
faculty  to  perceive  the  thing,  and  what  is  in  the  thing. 
These  perceptions  may  take  several  forms,  such  as  primitive 
cognitions,  faiths,  and  judgments:  cognitions  when  we 
look  directly  on  things,  faiths  when  they  are  absent  and 
yet  we  believe  in  them,  and  judgments  when  we  compare 
the  things  known  and  believed  in.  Our  perception  of  self 
and  body  having  power  is  of  the  nature  of  a  primitive 
cognition.  Our  conviction  as  to  cause  is  more  of  the  re- 
lation of  a  judgment  in  which  we  discover  a  relation.  Ex- 
cept that  I  am  not  partial  to  the  formidable  nomenclature, 
I  am  willing  to  allow  it  to  be  called,  with  Kant,  a  synthetic 
judgment  a  jJi'iori.  But  the  two,  cause  and  eifect,  are 
connected,  not  by  a  category  or  a  form  of  any  kind  in  the 
mind,  as  Kant  held,  but  in  the  very  nature  of  the  things, 
in  the  action  of  things  according  to  their  nature,  that  is, 
the  properties  or  powers  by  which  they  are  endowed. 


SECTION  IV. 

VARIOUS  SOKTS  OF  CAUSES. 

From  the  nature  of  causation,  as  I  have  endeavored  to 
unfold  it,  there  is  a  vast  complexity  in  the  activities  of  our 
world.  There  are  two,  or  commonly  more,  agents  in  every 
cause,  two  or  more  in  every  effect.  What  a  variety  of 
powers  at  w^ork  in  the  great  natural  occurrences,  say  in  the 
seasons,  in  the  production  of  spring  with  its  increased  heat, 
its  buds  and  blossoms  and  leaves.  What  a  complication 
in  the  production  of  the  great  epochs  of  history :  in  the 
spread  of  Christianity,  in  the  revival  of  learning  in  the 
fifteenth  century,  in  the  great  Keformation  of  religion, 
in  the  English,  the  American,  and  French  revolutions. 
There  are  innumerable  agencies  concurring  and  crossing 
in  all  the  important  events  of  our  personal  and  family 
life. 

In  this  complexity  a  number  of  very  marked  operations, 
w^ell  worthy  of  consideration,  come  under  our  view.  One 
of  these  is  Development  or  Evolution.  All  physical  cau- 
sation is  in  a  sense  evolution  ;  it  is  a  body,  or  rather  a  com- 
bination of  bodies  in  one  state  produced  by  a  body  or 
bodies  in  another  state.  The  development  as  such  may  or 
mav  not  be  beneficent.  It  is  conceivable  that  it  might 
move  on  ruthlessly,  working  only  confusion  and  misery  to 
sentient  beings.  When  it  proceeds  in  an  orderly  manner, 
with  beneficent  laws,  and  means  of  promoting  the  comfort 
of  animate  beings,  there  is  evidence  of  good  arrangement. 
The  subject  of  Development  is  so  important  as  to  require 


o6  VAKIODS   SORTS   OF   CAUSES. 

a  separate  paper,  when  it  will  be  shown  that  it  is  an  or- 
ganized causation. 

It  will  be  necessary  here  to  take  up  a  subject  on  which 
I  fear  little  light  can  be  thrown  at  present.  It  is  the  na- 
ture of  energy  and  causation  in  chemical  action.  Oxygen 
and  hydrogen  combine  to  form  water  ;  what  is  the  relation 
of  the  two  elements  ?  Is  it  simply  mechanical  ?  Or  does 
it  iniply  the  existence  and  operation  of  a  separate  power 
which  we  may  provisionally  call  the  chemical  ?  To  these 
questions  no  very  satisfactory^  I'eply  can  be  given  at  present. 
There  are  some  presumptions  in  favor  of  its  being  shown 
in  the  end  that  the  union  is  merely  mechanical.  On  the 
other  hand,  there  are  phenomena  which  cannot  be  thus  ex- 
plained at  the  stage  which  science  has  now  reached.  The 
most  remarkable  peculiarity  of  this  chemical  combination 
is  that  the  compound  exhibits  properties  of  which  no  trace 
can  be  found  in  the  separate  elements.  Water  shows 
qualities  which  neither  oxygen  nor  hydrogen  seem  to  pos- 
sess. In  consequence  many  questions  arise  which  cannot 
at  this  present  time  be  definitely  and  certainly  answered. 
Were  the  powers  now  shown  by  the  compound  in  the  ele- 
ments in  a  potential,  but  not  in  a  real  state  ?  Have  we  in 
the  union  merely  an  example  or  the  duality  or  plurality  in 
all  causation,  the  elements  taking  a  new  form  or  shape  in 
the  compound  ?  It  is  certain  the  bodies  constituting  the 
elements  have  not  lost  their  identity.  The  water  can  be 
decomposed,  by  some  other  body  acting  on  it,  into  the  oxy- 
gen and  hydrogen  of  which  it  is  composed. 

The  above  are  questions  which  we  may  expect  to  have 
settled  sooner  or  later,  as  we  come  to  know  more  of  the 
constitution  of  matter. 

In  the  complexity  of  causal  action  we  may  notice  the 
combination  of  a  number  of  agencies  necessary  in  order  to 
the  production  of  results  which  have  an  important  place 


Aristotle's  four  causes.  37 

in  the  economy  of  nature.  These,  in  a  loose  sense,  may 
be  called  causes.  From  the  very  commencement  of  re- 
flective inquiry  men  had  to  refer  to  causes.  But  for  ages 
the  views  taken  and  the  nomenclature  used  were  vague  and 
confused,  though  containing  important  elements  of  truth 
which  have  been  unfortunately  omitted  in  the  more  pre- 
cise systems  of  modern  times.  In  tlie  theosophies  of  the 
East  causation  was  represented  as  an  emanation  of  one  thing 
out  of  another,  and  of  all  things  out  of  God.  The  ten- 
dency in  this  conception  was  toward  pantheism.  The 
Pythagoreans  made  numbers  the  cause  of  things,  meaning 
that  which  makes  things  what  they  are.  Aristotle  blames 
Plato  for  neglecting  efficient  and  linal  causes  and  giving 
exclusive  attention  to  the  matter  out  of  which  things  are 
formed,  and  the  form  they  are  made  to  take. 

Aristotle  was  the  first  to  draw  distinction  between  the 
different  kinds  of  cause.  This  he  did  in  his  Physics,  ii.  3, 
and  recapitulated  in  his  Metaphysics,  i.  3,  with  a  farther 
reference  in  Post  Anal.,  ii.  11.  In  these  passages  he  uses 
the  word  (cause)  in  a  widei*,  and  it  may  be  allowed  in  a 
looser,  sense  than  we  now  do.  The  grand  object  of  the 
First  Philosophy  is  to  discover  causes.-  By  cause  he  meant 
all  that  is  necessary  to  account  for  or  explain  a  thing,  all 
that  is  necessary  in  order  to  its  heing  as  it  is,  and  there- 
fore to  our  comprehending  it  and  explaining  it.  In  later 
times  the  word  cause  is  commonly  restricted  to  efficient 
cause,  to  productive  cause,  or  as  Hume  analyzed  it,  inva- 
riable antecedent.  Aristotle  included  this,  but  also  in- 
cluded other  things  necessary/,  as  he  thought,  to  make  a 
thing  lohat  it  is  /  which  is  his  definition  of  cause.  He  had 
four  kinds  of  causes.  He  had  first  a  matter  and  a  subject 
{rrjv  v\7)v  Kai  to  viroKelfJievov).  He  had  secondly  a  cause, 
whence  the  beginning  of  motion  {66ev  rj  ap^V  r?}?  KLvr)crea}<;). 
Thirdly,  he  had  a  cause  which  was  the  substance — that  in 


38  VARIOUS   SORTS    OF   CAUSES. 

whicli  a  tiling  consisted  {tt]p  ova  lav  koI  to  tl  rjv  elvai). 
Fourthly,  he  had  that  on  account  of  which  a  thing  is  (to 
6v  €V€Ka).  More  briefly,  he  had  a  vXr/,  an  ap^h  /cti^/jcreco?, 
an  eoSo^;,  and  a  t6Xo<;,  which  we  translate  a  material,  an 
efficient,  a  formal,  and  a  final  cause.  He  sought  in  every 
object  for  each  of  these.  He  did  not  regard  the  one  as 
inconsistent  with  the  other.  He  often  found  several  of 
them  in  one  and  the  same  object  (De  Anim.,  ii.  8).  In 
regard  to  the  material  cause,  he  represents  the  lonians  as 
seeking  for  it  and  finding  it  in  water,  air,  or  fire.  As  to 
the  efficient  cause,  he  regarded  it  as  that  which  produces 
motion  or  change.  The  formal  cause  corresponded  to  the 
Idea  of  Plato,  only  he  represents  it  as  being  not  above 
things,  but  in  things.  He  does  not  use  final  cause  to 
prove  the  divine  existence ;  he  supposes  the  thing  to  have 
in  itself  (as  immanent)  an  end  after  which  it  is  striving — 
a  view  very  much  the  same  as  that  taken  by  Hegel.  He 
blames  Plato  for  neglecting  the  efficient  and  the  final,  and 
confining  his  attention  to  the  material  and  the  formal. 

These  distinctions  were  not  drawn  by  the  thinkers  who 
preceded  Aristotle.  Socrates,  without  giving  final  cause  a 
separate  place,  used  the  argument  from  final  cause — the 
argument  from  intention  or  design,  as  seen  for  instance  in 
the  eyelids  to  protect  the  eyes.  Plato  argued  more  from 
the  models  or  patterns  in  nature.  Epicurus  simply  ignored 
final  causes.  Tho  Stoics  identified  efficient  and  final, 
representing  every  thing  as  done  in  conformity  with  the 
decree  (fatum)  of  God ;  and  so  ordered  that  one  tiling  is  a 
prognostic  of  another  thing.  Cicero  (De  xN^at.  Deor.  115) 
and  Augustine  (Civ.  Dei,  xi.  4,  21)  appeal,  like  Plato,  to 
the  order  of  the  universe.  The  schoolmen  did  not  use 
Aristotle's  division  of  causes  so  frequently  as  they  did  his 
logical  distinctions,  but  occasionally  they  proceeded  upon  it. 

Coming  to  modern  times.  Bacon  adopted  Aristotle's  four- 


MATEKIAL,  EFFICIENT,  FORMAL,  AND   FINAL.         39 

fold  division  of  causes.  He  gives  material  and  formal 
causes  to  Physics,  and  formal  and  final  to  Metaphysics, 
which  he  regards  as  occupying  a  higlier  sphere  than  phy- 
sics. It  is  often  said,  by  men  who  have  never  read  Bacon's 
works  and  take  his  opinions  at  second-hand,  that  Bacon 
sets  aside  final  cause.  Tliis  is  an  entire  mistake.  He 
would  exclude  it  from  physics,  but  it  is  only  to  give  it  a 
higher  place  in  metaphysics.  He  compares  it  to  the  vestal 
virgins,  not  productive  indeed,  but  dedicated  to  God.  He 
erred,  I  think,  in  excluding  final  cause  altogether  from 
physics,  where  it  may  be  used,  if  properly  restricted,  in 
the  study  of  organisms,  where  the  means  are  ends  and  the 
ends  means.  While  he  was  living,  Harvey  discovered  the 
circulation  of  the  blood  by  the  principle  of  teleology,  argu- 
ing that  the  valves  which  he  saw  opening  in  one  direction 
and  not  in  the  opposite  must  be  intended  to  let  a  fiuid 
pass  tlirough — thus  discovering  the  grand  doctrine  of  the 
circulation  of  the  blood.  But  Bacon  was  right  in  insisting  so 
strongly  that  the  discovery  of  final  cause  should  not  keep  men 
from  seeking  the  efficient  cause.  Bacon  attached  great 
importance  to  the  discovery  of  forms,  which  he  represented 
as  the  supreme  end  of  all  science.  The  form  of  a  thing  is 
that  which  makes  it  what  it  is — thus,  anticipating  our  latest 
science,  he  regards  motion  as  the  form  of  heat.  Without 
fully  seeing  it,  he  came  very  near  to  Plato  ;  the  aim  of  all 
science,  according  to  both,  being  to  discover  ideas,  forms, 
or  patterns ;  onl}^,  accoiding  to  Plato,  the  ideas  are  to  be 
discovered  hy  calling  forth  the  inward  idea,  while  accord- 
ing to  Bacon  they  are  to  be  found  by  a  careful  induction 
of  facts.  Bacon  showed  profound  wisdom  in  making  the 
discovery  of  forms  the  supreme  end  of  all  science  ;  and  in 
placing  the  forms  of  nature  at  the  very  top  of  the  pyramid 
and  next  unto  God. 

Descartes  perceived  God  in  every  mechanical  action,  and 


40  VARIOUS    SORTS    OP^   CAUSES. 

could  not  believe  that  God  was  to  be  seen  in  one  act 
more  than  in  another;  and  insists  that  we  ought  to  be- 
ware lest,  "  in  our  presumption,  we  imagine  that  the  ends 
which  God  proposed  to  Himself  in  the  creation  of  the 
world  are  understood  bj  ns"  (Princip.  Philos.,  iii.  2). 
There  is  a  misapprehension  here  of  the  kind  of  ends  sup- 
posed to  be  discovered  by  final  cause,  and  it  is  curious  that 
his  error  is  pointed  out  by  Gassendi,  an  adherent  of  the 
Epicurean  philosophy.  "  You  say,"  he  replies  to  Des- 
cartes, "  that  it  does  not  seem  to  you  that  you  could  inves- 
tigate and  undertake  to  discover  without  rashness  the  ends 
of  God.  But  although  that  may  be  true  if  you  mean  to 
speak  of  ends  that  God  has  willed  to  be  hidden,  still  it 
cannot  be  the  case  with  those  which  He  has,  as  it  were, 
exposed  to  the  view  of  the  world,  and  which  are  discovered 
without  much  labor."  The  celebrated  natural  philosopher 
Robert  Boyle  also  answered  Descartes.  Referring  to  a 
gnomonic  instrument,  "  It  would  no  doubt  be  gi-eat  pre- 
sumption on  the  part  of  a  peasant,  ignorant  alike  of  mathe- 
matical science  and  the  intentions  of  the  artist,  to  believe 
liimself  capable  of  discovering  all  the  ends  in  view  of 
which  this  machine  so  curiously  w^rought  has  been  con- 
structed ;  but  when  he  reuiarks  that  it  is  furnished 
with  an  index  with  lines  and  horary  numbers — in  short, 
with  all  that  constitutes  a  sun-dial,  and  sees  successively 
the  shadow  of  the  index  mark  in  succession  the  hour  of 
the  day,  there  would  on  his  part  be  as  little  presumption 
as  error  in  concluding  that  this  instrument,  whatever  may 
be  its  other  uses,  is  certainly  a  dial  made  to  show  the 
iiours."  Leibnitz,  with  his  usual  comprehensiveness  of 
mind,  would  unite  final  and  physical  causes.  "  It  is  good," 
he  says,  "  to  conciliate  those  who  hope  to  explain  mechani- 
cally the  formation  of  the  first  texture  of  an  animal,  and 
of  the  entire  mechanism  of  the  parts  with  those  who  give 


MATERIAL   AND   EFFICIENT.  41 

an  account  of  the  same  structure  by  final  causes.  Both 
are  good,  and  the  authors  who  follow  these  different  ways 
ought  not  to  abuse  each  other."  ' 

From  this  survey  we  gatlier  that  some  of  the  profonndest 
thinkers  that  have  appeared  in  our  world  have  seen  more 
than  mechanical  cause  in  the  course  of  nature,  and  that 
they  have  discovered  no  inconsistency  between  efficient 
and  final  cause.     We  are  now  to  illustrate  these  two  points. 

There  is  a  foundation  in  nature  for  Aristotle's  fourfold 
division  of  explanatory  causes,  though  we  may  have  to 
amend  it  somewhat  to  suit  it  to  modern  science. 

Ifaterial  Cause. — Here  w^e  inquire  into  the  nature  of  the 
substances,  be  they  inanimate  body,  or  living  body  or 
mind.  It  is  the  end  pursued  in  chemistry,  and  in  all  the 
sciences  dependent  on  it,  and  so  far  also  in  psychology. 
No  doubt  the  inquiries  into  the  matter,  and  the  forces  in 
matter,  may  be  mixed  up  with  each  other ;  but  they  may 
be  distinguished,  and  it  is  often  desirable  to  separate  them. 

We  may  or  may  not  approve  of  calling  the  matter  out 
of  which  a  thing  is  formed  a  cause,  but  it  certainly  has  a 
place,  and  this  a  deep  one,  in  the  economy  of  nature,  and 
as  such  it  should  be  acknowledged.  It  is  allowed  that 
there  is  never  energy  without  body,  and  the  body  should 
be  taken  into  account  as  well  as  the  energy,  in  explaining 
what  things  are  and  how  they  act. 

Efficient  Cause. — This  is  the  kind  of  cause  whose  nature 
I  have  been  seeking  to  determine  in  the  earlier  part  of  this 
paper.  It  is  the  power  element  in  what  makes  a  thing  to 
be  what  it  is.  This  sort  of  cause  is  not  inconsistent  with 
the  others.  It  is  necessarj^  in  order  to  make  the  matter 
take  a  form  and  fulfil  an  end. 


'  The  quotations  from  Gassendi,  Boyle,  and  Leibnitz  may  be  found 
in  M.  Janet's  work  on  "Final  Cause,"  translated  by  W.  Affleck,  pp.  184, 
185,  119. 


42  VARIOUS   SORTS    OF    CAUSES. 

Formal  Cause — the  idea  of  Plato,  the  et8o?  of  Aristotle, 
the  law  of  modern  science,  and  the  type  of  naturalists. 
We  have  here  mechanical  causes,  but  co-ordinated  so  as  to 
produce  orderly  results,  as  we  see  in  what  are  called  the 
laws  of  nature.  The  properties  of  bodies,  such  as  attrac- 
tion, chemical  affinity,  etc.,  may  be  simple ;  but  they  re- 
quire conditions,  that  is,  co-operating  agents,  in  order  to 
their  working.  But  the  general  laws  of  nature  are  always 
complex ;  that  is,  imply  the  action  of  two  or  more  agents 
operating  and  co-operating.  We  see  this  in  the  law  of  the 
succession  of  day  and  night,  of  the  revolution  of  the 
seasons,  spring,  summer,  autumn,  and  winter;  in  the 
motion  of  the  planets  in  their  orbits.  What  a  number  and 
variety  of  agents  conspiring  in  the  reproduction  of  plants 
and  animals ;  in  the  seed,  the  blade,  the  fruit,  the  decay 
of  the  vegetable ;  in  the  germ,  the  growth,  the  death  of 
the  animal!  What  a  complexity  in  order  to  the  pro- 
duction of  the  mathematically  exact  forms  and  harmonious 
colors  of  the  shell,  the  stalk  and  the  flower  of  plants,  and  the 
bones  of  animals  !  What  a  combination  to  produce  those 
types  according  to  which  we  classify  the  animate  king- 
doms, and  which  make  every  living  thing  to  grow  after  its 
kind !  What  a  complex  complexity  in  that  assortment  of 
forces  which  produce  development  and  heredity — processes 
of  which  we  now  talk  so  glibly  and  familiarly,  but  of  the 
elements  of  which  we  know  so  little !  All  these  may  be 
called  the  ideas  or  forms  of  nature. 

Much  the  same  may  be  said  of  Formal  as  I  have  said  of 
Material  cause  :  we  may  or  may  not  approve  of  the  term 
cause  being  applied  to  it.  But  it  is  quite  as  clear  that 
things  are  made  to  take  a  form  as  that  they  have  a  matter, 
and  are  produced  out  of  that  matter.  It  is  one  end  aimed 
at  in  all  science  to  discover  what  the  form,  or,  as  it  is  now 
more  commonly  called,  the  law  is.     Our  view  of  nature  is 


FORMAL   AND    FINAL    CAUSE.  43 

narrow  and  partial  if  we  see  only  its  composition  and  the 
mechanical  powers  acting  in  it.  In  that  rich  web  we 
should  notice  not  only  the  silk  threads  and  the  shuttle 
carrying  them  along,  but  also  the  pattern  after  which  the 
whole  is  formed. 

Final  Cause. — Here  there  is  a  concurrence  of  mechanical 
or  efficient  causes  to  produce  an  evident  result.  It  is  not 
an  antecedent  followed  by  an  effect ;  it  is  the  consequent 
or  issue  of  a  number  of  conspiring  antecedents.  From 
the  number  of  agents  combining  to  effect  an  end  we 
argue  that  there  are  intentions  and  purposes.  I  suppose 
a  hundred  agents  so  far  independent  must  combine  before 
I  can  see.  I  infer  that  there  must  have  been  a  designed 
arrangement  in  order  to  their  coming  together  to  produce 
the  obvious  end. 

We  discover  these  four  causes  in  the  works  of  man. 
That  statue  of  Hercules  had  a  material  cause  in  the  marble 
in  the  quarry  ;  an  efficient  cause  in  tiie  chisel  of  the  sculp- 
tor ;  a  formal  cause  in  the  shape  given  it ;  and  a  final  cause 
in  its  being  set  up  in  a  temple.  We  can  discover  the  same 
four  causes  in  nature.  In  shells  we  have  the  matter,  be  it 
carbonate  of  lime,  or  whatever  else ;  the  chemical  forces 
operating  ;  the  mathematical  form  taken — possibly  a  spiral ; 
and  an  end  the  protection  of  the  animal.  In  the  plant, 
say  the  apple-tree,  we  have  the  chemical  elements ;  we 
have  the  vital  forces,  whatever  they  be ;  we  have  the  shape 
taken  by  the  tree  and  by  its  flower;  and  a  final  cause  in 
the  fruit  provided  for  the  sustenance  of  living  creatures. 
In  the  cereals  there  is  matter  in  the  composition  of  the 
plants,  an  efficient  (not  necessarily  a  mechanical)  cause  in 
the  vital  forces,  a  formal  cause  in  the  form  taken,  and  a 
final  cause  in  the  food  provided  for  the  nourishment  of 
man  and  living  creatures.  Take  the  two  colors,  blue-purple 
and  orange-yellow,  found  in  the  flower  of  the  forget- me- 


44  VARIOUS   SORTS   OF   CAUSES. 

not :  tliey  must  have  a  composition  produced  in  some  way 
by  the  dividing  of  the  beam ;  they  are  found  in  all  the 
plants  of  the  species ;  and  they  are  suited  to  the  eye,  which 
delights  to  look  on  complementary  colors — that  is,  the 
colors  that  make  up  the  beam. 

I  believe  that  these  four  pi'inciples  can  be  discovered  in 
all  animated  objects.  In  dead  matter  it  may  be  more 
difficult  to  detect  all  of  them  in  every  individual  object. 
Yet  in  the  higher  forms  we  can  discover  several  of  them. 
Thus  in  crystals,  the  crystalline  forms,  which  all  bodily 
substances  are  capable  of  assuming,  we  have  the  matter, 
the  forces,  and  also  the  forms;  but  it  might  be  difficult  to 
discover  a  special  final  cause.  Plato,  in  seeking  to  find  his 
idea  everywhere,  was  asked  whether  he  could  find  it  in  the 
dust  or  sand  of  the  ground,  and  acknowledged  that  he  was 
iu  difficulties.  Modern  science  could  help  him  here,  and 
show  him  by  the  microscope  beautiful  forms  in  the  rudest 
matter.  It  might  be  impossible  in  such  cases  to  detect  a 
final  cause;  but  just  as  we  argue  that  there  is  efficient 
cause  everywhere,  though  we  may  not  be  able  to  discover 
it  in  every  occurrence,  we  may,  on  a  like  principle,  hifer 
that  as  we  discover  a  purpose  in  so  many  parts  of  nature 
so  there  is  purpose  everywhere,  if  only  we  can  discover  it ; 
and  thus  reach  the  conclusion  of  Socrates,  Plato,  and  Leib- 
nitz, that  nature  consists  of  physical  causes  working  for 
ends. 


SECTION  V. 

■FINAIu   CAUSE. 

I  AM  sure  that  the  course  of  nature  cannot  be  compre- 
hended or  explained  except  by  taking  into  account  more 
than  efficient  cause,  except  indeed  by  all  of  the  principles 
we  have  been  considering.  The  chemist  will  insist  on 
knowing  what  is  the  elemental  composition  of  the  crj'stal, 
the  rose,  or  the  crustacean.  The  naturalist  will  seek  for 
the  type  that  he  may  be  able  to  arrange  it.  The  merchant 
will  wish  to  know  its  economical  use  that  he  may  buy  or 
sell  it. 

We  know  not  what  is  the  number  of  elements  in  the 
material  universe.  The  ancient  Greeks  supposed  them  to 
be  four :  air,  water,  fire,  and  earth.  Modern  chemistry 
has  found  sixty-four,  which  it  cannot  analyze  into  any 
thing  simpler.  Many  chemists  think  that  some  of  these 
can  be  resolved  into  others.  It  is  certain  that  there  is  in 
nature  a  certain  number  of  elements,  be  it  four  or  sixty- 
four,  with  their  properties.  We  may  conclude  that  these 
are  adapted  to  each  other.  Were  they  not,  they  would 
not  act  upon  each  other,  molecule  on  molecule,  atom  on 
atom,  mass  on  mass,  as  they  evidently  do.  The  orderly 
results  point  to  an  instituted  order.  Being  so  adapted,  if 
these  elements  were  cast  into  a  capacious  vessel,  they 
would  produce  regular  results  such  as  we  see  in  a  kaleido- 
scope, where  we  have  a  number  of  beads  thrown  into  a 
constructed  receptacle,  and  reflected  by  glass,  and  produc- 
ing regular  figures.    Here  we  have  in  the  figures  a  material 


46  FINAL   CAUSE. 

cause  in  the  instrument,  with  its  wood  and  glass  and  beads ; 
an  efficient  cause  in  the  movements  of  the  beads ;  and  a 
formal  cause  in  the  regular  shapes  and  dispositions.  It 
can  scarcely  be  said  that  in  the  figures  tiiemselves  there  is 
a  final  cause,  for  no  end  is  served  by  them,  except  indeed 
to  give  pleasure  to  the  beholder.  But  there  is  certainly  a 
formal  cause.  And  I  would  have  it  noticed  that  this  form 
is  a  result  of  arrangements  made,  and  of  mutual  adaptations, 
arguing  a  purpose  and  design.  So  it  is  with  the  laws,  as 
they  are  called,  and  types  of  nature.  They  are  the  result 
of  a  vast  number  of  agents  or  efficient  causes  combining 
and  co-operating.  We  thus  see  that  the  very  order  of 
nature  is  a  manifestation  and  evidence,  as  Plato,  Cicero, 
and  Augustine  argued,  of  plan  and  purpose,  and  therefore 
of  intelligence. 

But  Final  Cause  furnishes  another  and  a  more  special 
argument.  It  may  be  noticed  of  the  figures  of  the  kaleido- 
scope that  they  never  show  final  cause,  properly  so  called. 
They  never  show  amidst  their  great  varieties  such  utility 
as  a  lichen,  a  polype,  a  finger  or  a  toe,  much  less  a  hand  or 
an  ear.  Mathematicians  tell  us  how  many  millions  of 
chances  there  are  against  a  handful  of  molecules  ever  pro- 
ducing an  ear,  and  how  many  millions  of  millions  against 
their  producing  in  the  same  frame  an  eye,  a  nose,  a  tongue, 
,  skin,  and  muscle,  and  nerve,  and  brain.  How  many  mil- 
\  liards  of  milliards  of  chances  agahist  the  formation  of  all 
the  senses  and  organs  of  all  the  creatures  on  the  face  of 
the  earth.  The  meeting  of  these  efficient  causes  in  the 
frame  of  man  and  animal  makes  it  as  certain  as  mathe- 
matics can  make  it  of  their  being  an  end  contemplated  and 
designed. 

The  force  of  this  argument  is  not  to  be  avoided  by  say- 
ing that  what  we  represent  as  final  causes  are  merely  con- 
ditions of  existence.    True  they  are  conditions  of  existence ; 


REVIEW    OF   PROFESSOR  NEWCOMB.  47 

bnt  the  proofs  of  design  lie  in  the  conditions  of  existence 
all  meeting  in  the  hundreds  or  thousands  of  coincidences 
all  coming  together  to  form  the  rose,  or  the  deer.  The 
strino's  of  a  harp  are  the  conditions  of  its  existence,  and 
we  argue  that  the  harp  has  been  made  for  a  purpose,  he- 
cause  the  strings  are  all  there  and  yield  music. 

At  this  place  I  think  it  proper  to  refer  to  the  Course  of 
Nature^  an  address  delivered  by  Professor  I^Tewcomb,  as 
President  of  the  American  Association  for  the  Promotion  of 
Science.    I  do  so  because  there  is  presented  there,  by  a  gen- 
tleman whom  I  profoundly  respect,  the  views  entertained  by 
a  great  many  scientific  men  in  the  present  day.    The  Pro- 
fessor evidently  labors  under  several  very  erroneous  impres- 
sions in  regard  to  final  cause.     "  From  the  very  earliest  at 
which  man  began  to  think  two  modes  of  explaining  the 
operations  of  nature  have  presented  themselves  to  his  at- 
tention.    These  modes  are  sometimes  designated  as  the 
teleological  and  mechanical."    He  thinks  that  final  cause  is 
meant  to  give  the  same  sort  of  explanation  of  a  phenome- 
non as  efficient  cause.     But  all  enlightened  defenders  of 
final  cause  have  asserted  that  the  two  principles  or  causes 
do  not  accomplish  the  same  ends.     Final  causes  or  ends 
were  never  meant  to  account  for  the  production  of  an  event ; 
this  is  done  by  efficient  cause.    On  the  other  hand,  an  effi- 
cient cause  does  not  show  how  efficient  causes  or  forces 
should  combine  to  produce  an  obviously  intended  beneficent 
result— the  good,  as  Aristotle  calls  the  final  cause.     The 
fact  that  the  ear  was  meant  to  hear  did  not  make  the  ear, 
though  there  are  passages  in  Lamarck  which  seem  to  indi- 
cate that  the  wish  of  the  fish  to  fiy  actually  gave  it  wings. 
We  bring  in  efficient  cause  to  explain  one  thing,  namely, 
production ;  and  final  cause  to  explain  another  thing,  a 
combination  to  produce  a  useful  end.     Again,  he  argues 
that  we  are  entitled  to  call  in  final  cause  only  when  physi- 


48  FINAL   CAUSE. 

.cal  cause  fails,  thereby  falling  into  the  error  of  Kant  and 
Laplace,  both  far-sighted  but  one-eyed  men.  But  surely 
he  sees  both  efficient  and  final  cause  in  the  telescope  by 
which  he  scans  the  heavens  so  profitably :  efficient  cause 
in  the  formation  of  it  by  Clark,  and  final  cause  in  the  use 
to  which  he  is  able  to  turn  it.  Xor  will  it  do  to  say  that 
he  uses  the  instrument  because  it  is  there  ;  it  is  there  be- 
cause he  or  some  other  was  meant  to  employ  it.  It  is 
conceivable  that  there  should  be  a  like  union  of  the  two 
principles  in  the  eye  and  in  the  works  of  nature  generally. 

He  is  evidently  under  a  farther  impression  that  the  two 
are  inconsistent.  He  thus  makes  them  rivals,  and  supposes 
that  the  one  strives  with  and  overcomes  the  other.  But 
final  cause,  so  far  from  being  inconsistent  with  efficient 
cause,  implies  a  combination  of  physical  causes,  which  are 
blind  in  themselves,  but  which  are  led  by  a  prearranging 
power  to  combine  to  accomplish  an  end.  He  insinuates 
that  as  mechanical  cause  comes  to  be  seen  everj^where  final 
cause  will  have  to  hide  itself.  But  viewed  by  a  mind 
capable  of  seeing  two  truths  alongside  of  each  other,  the 
belief  in  and  the  evidence  of  ends  in  nature  are  not  vanish- 
ing, as  the  Professor  expects.  We  have  as  clear  and  cer- 
tain proof  that  the  eye  was  meant  to  see  and  the  ear  to 
hear  as  the  first  man  had,  and  can  now  discover  more  f  nlly 
the  wonderful  machinery  by  which  the  ends  are  effected. 

The  Professor's  argument  against  final  cause  is  the  most 
glaring  example  of  the  fallacy  of  irrelevant  conclusion  or 
of  ignoratio  elenchi,  which  I  have  seen  for  many  a  day. 
He  would  disprove  the  existence  of  final  cause,  and  he 
merely  attempts  to  prove  the  universal  presence  of  mechani- 
cal cause.  With  proper  explanations  we  may  admit  all  he 
claims  as  to  mechanism  and  not  feel  thereby  that  teleology 
is  weakened.  Let  us  look  at  the  principles  at  work  when 
our  astronomer  gazes  at  a  binary  star  with  his  telescope. 


EFFICIENT   AND    FINAL   CAUSE.  49 

Eays  go  out  from  the  star,  proceed  in  vibrations,  first 
throngli  millions  of  miles  of  ether,  then  through  thousands 
of  miles  of  air  ;  then  into  the  telescope,  where  they  are 
turned  in  a  variety  of  ways ;  then  into  the  eye,  into  the 
cornea,  which  is  transparent;  into  convergent  media,  which 
unite  the  luminous  rays,  the  three  refracting  media— the 
aqueous  humor,  crystalline  lens,  and  vitreous  humor— till 
they  fall  on  the  retina,  where,  according  to  the  theory  of 
Young,  carried  out  by  Helmholtz,  thei'e  are  twelve  thou- 
sand or  even  twenty  thousand  cones,  sensitive  to  various 
kinds  of  light,  and  they  form  there  the  image  of  two  stars 
with  perhaps  complementary  colors.  The  process  is  not 
ended  till  an  action  goes  up  through  the  optic  nerve  into 
the  brain,  and  not  till  then  does  the  astronomer  see  his 
star.  The  want  or  the  failure  of  any  one  of  these  proces- 
ses, thousands  in  number,  would  prevent  vision  or  make  it 
imperfect.'  In  this  long  and  complicated  process  there  has 
been  mechanical  cause  throughout.  Professor  Kewcomb 
w411  not  deny  that  there  is  final  cause,  in  the  part  of  it 
which  goes  on  in  the  telescope ;  but  if  there  be  an  end 
manifested  in  the  passage  of  the  rays  through  the  one  in- 
strument, the  telescope,  there  is  like,  but  far  stronger  evi- 
dence of  a  purpose  in  the  other  instrument,  the  eye. 

In  all  such  discussions  a  distinction  of  some  kind  is  drawn 
as  to  the  actual  operations  of  the  forces  or  laws  of  nature. 

J  M.  Janet  has  shown  that  Helmholtz  has  answered  his  own  objection 
derived  from  the  imperfections  in  the  eye.  The  great  German  physi- 
cist says  :  "  The  appropriateness  of  the  eye  to  its  end  exists  in  the  most 
perfect  manner,  and  is  revealed  even  in  the  limits  given  to  its  defects. 
A  reasonable  man  will  not  take  a  razor  to  cleave  blocks  ;  in  like  manner 
every  ussful  refinement  in  the  optical  use  of  the  eye  would  have  ren- 
dered that  organ  more  delicate  and  slower  in  its  application."  This  is 
sufficient  to  defend  final  cause.  But  a  full  explanation  may  have  to 
take  into  account  the  existence— the  great  mystery  of  our  world— of 
disease  and  pain. 


50  FINAL   CAUSE. 

Palej  in  his  "Xatural  Theology"  indicates  a  distinction 
between  the  laws  of  nature  and  their  construction,  and 
speaks  of  an  adjustment  being  necessary,  and  of  ''the  laws 
being  fixed"  and  "the  construction  being  adapted  to  them" 
("]Nat.  TheoL,"  iii.).  Dr.  Chalmers  drew  elaborately 
and  illustrated  at  great  length  the  distinction  between  the 
Laws  of  Matter  and  the  Collocations  or  Dispositions  of 
Matter.  "  We  can  imagine  all  the  present  and  existing 
laws  of  matter  to  be  in  full  operation,  and  yet,  just  for  the 
want  of  a  right  local  disposition  of  parts,  the  universe 
might  be  that  wild  undigested  medley  of  things  in  which 
no  one  trace  or  character  of  a  designing  architect  was  at  all 
discernible  "  {"  Nat.  TheoL,"  ii.  1).  Mr.  Mill  has  adopted 
this  distinction,  and  sees  that  "  collocations  as  well  as  laws 
are  necessary  to  the  operation  of  nature  "  ("  Log.,"  iii.  12, 
16).  I  have  taken  up  the  subject  at  this  point  and  endeavored 
to  give  the  distinction  greater  precision.  I  have  shown 
that  it  is  between,  not  the  laws  of  matter  and  collocations, 
but  between  the  properties  of  matter  and  adjustments 
necessary  to  their  operation.  I  have  shown  that  the  laws 
of  matter  are  not  simple,  but  complex,  and  imply  adjust- 
ments ;  this  is  the  case  with  the  seasons,  the  typical  forms 
of  plants  and  animals ;  all  imply  a  number  of  agents  or 
properties  combined  to  produce  a  uniform  result.  Such 
laws  are  not  mechanical  forces,  but  the  results  of  mechani- 
cal forces  adjusted  {"  Meth.  Div.  Gov.,"  ii.  1)  and  implying 
a  pm-pose.  Professor  Xewcomb  seems  to  feel  a  difficulty 
in  understanding  how  there  should  be  anything  else  than 
mechanism  necessary  to  explain  the  course  of  nature.  And 
yet  he  has  been  obliged  to  di-aw  this  very  distinction  with- 
out seeing  its  meaning:  " In  this  work  we  have  to  be  con- 
cerned with  two  things — the  general  laws  of  nature,  as 
they  are  familiarly  called,  and  the  facts  or  circumstances 
which  determine  the  operation  of  these  laws." 


MECHANICAL    CAUSES   AND    ENDS.  51 

The  Professor  imagines  that  final  cause  implies  "  inter- 
ference" and  "miracles,"  and  says:  "We  are  not  to  call 
in  a  supernatural  cause  to  account  for  a  residt  which  could 
have  heen  produced  by  the  action  of  the  known  laws  of 
nature."  But  according  to  the  view  of  the  great  body  of 
the  supporters  of  final  cause,  and  according  to  the  view 
now  presented,  we  do  not  need  to  call  in  a  "  supernatural 
cause,"  for  all  may  be  performed  by  the  known  laws  of 
nature.  Xor  do  we  need  an  interference  to  bring  about 
the  special  designs  of  God,  say  to  send  blessings,  when 
God  so  intends  it,  to  reward  the  good ;  or  judgments  when 
He  means  to  arrest  the  evil,  or  to  give  an  answer  to  prayer 
for  things  agreeable  to  His  will.  There  is  no  interference 
with  the  machine  in  a  factory  when  it  lets  off  its  cotton, 
or  its  linen  thread,  or  its  paper ;  it  was  planned  and  ad- 
justed for  this  very  purpose.  The  grain-reaper  is  all 
mechanical,  and  it  has  no  conscious  design;  but  it  throws 
off  and  binds  its  sheaves  for  an  evident  purpose.  So  in 
the  far  grander  machinery  of  nature  it  is  arranged  that 
good  is  encouraged  and  evil  so  far  restrained  and  punished. 
True,  the  mechanical  forces  work  blindly :  they  know  not 
and  do  not  care  for  the  consequences ;  but  these  were  all 
foreseen  by  One  who  appointed  them  and  arranged  them 
for  the  accomplishment  of  grand  purposes,  and  small  ones 
— as  we  reckon  them ;  for  tlie  progress  of  the  world  in 
knowledge  and  civilization,  to  adorn  that  lily,  to  feed  that 
raven,  to  secure  that  the  sparrow  cannot  fall  to  the  ground, 
and  protect,  in  answer  to  prayer,  the  widow  and  the  father- 
less. 

I  could  show,  if  the  time  allowed  or  the  subject  required, 
that  there  is  a  wonderful  correspondence  between  tlie 
scientific  doctrine  of  the  uniformity  of  nature  and  the 
Scripture  doctrine  of  foreordination.  They  are  the  same 
truths ;  the  one  seen  from  below  and  from  the  earth,  the 


52  FINAL   CAUSE. 

other  seen  from  above  and  from  heaven.  Both  imply  that 
/  every  thing  is  fixed  ;  but  both  also  imply  that  every  thhig 
is  arranged  to  accomplish  special,  and  these  beneficent, 
ends.  Nature  is  uniform,  and  as  we  perceive  it  to  be  so, 
we  proceed  to  use  that  very  uniformity.  Every  thiug  is 
ordained,  and  believing  that  prayer  is  one  of  the  ordained 
means,  we  use  prayer  to  secure  our  ends — these  ends  being 
agreeable  to  His  will.  Because  nature  is  uniform,  we  do 
not,  tlierefore,  on  account  of  speculative  difficulties,  refuse 
to  toil  for  our  food.  Just  as  little  does  the  Christian, 
because  of  infidel  objections,  refuse  to  pray  for  blessings 
such  as  God  is  ready  to  give ;  and  he  finds  that  the  bless- 
ing has  been  ordained  and  comes  at  the  proper  time,  and 
in  answer  to  the  prayer  which  has  also  been  ordained,  and 
this  to  secure  its  end. 

Professor  Newcomb  quotes,  without  naming  me,  my  de- 
fence of  Providence  in  my  work  on  "  The  Method  of  the 
Divine  Government,"  and  objects  to  my  statement  that  a 
rock  may  fall  at  a  prearranged  moment  and  kill  a  person 
beneath  it.  He  says  "  the  moment  is  fixed  entirely  by 
antecedent  circumstances,  such  as  the  solubility  of  the  rock 
and  the  amount  of  water  which  percolates  over  it.  At 
that  very  moment  the  rock  begins  to  fall."  Now  I  agree 
with  all  this.  But  he  himself  has  admitted  that  there  are 
"  facts  or  circumstances  which  determine  the  operation  of 
these  laws."  The  question  arises  who  arranged  these 
"  facts  or  circumstances,"  which  are  needed,  however  far 
we  go  back  beyond  the  nature  of  the  rock  and  the  water, 
and  which  imply  an  arrangement  from  the  beginning  ?  He 
acknowledges  that  if  we  had  sufficient  capacity  we  could 
from  a  knowledge  of  the  causes  (including  always  their 
adaptations)  predict  all  that  w^ould  follow.  But  if  this  be 
so,  may  we  not  conceive  of  a  Being  who  not  only  foresees 
but  has  arranged  all  that  follows  ?     That  Being  might  so 


JxVNET   OX   FINAL   CAUSE.  53 

arrange  them  that  special  ends  are  accomplisliecl,  and  these 
such  that  they  are  obvious  to  every  thinking  mind. 

JSTor  are  we,  in  discovering  these  ends,  going  into  the 
region  of  speculation,  to  which  the  Professor  allots  every 
thing  but  mechanical  cause.  He  talks  of  science,  meaning 
mechanical,  concerning  itself  ''  with  phenomena  and  the 
relations  which  connect  them."  I  am  sure  that  the  same 
intelligence  which  can  discover  the  connections  and  relations 
in  mechanical  cause  is  all  that  is  needed  to  discover  the 
combination  of  causes  which  constitutes  final  cause.  As 
M.  Janet  puts  it,  "  The  error  of  the  scientists  is  in  believ- 
ing that  they  have  eliminated  final  causes  from  nature, 
when  the^'-  have  shown  how  certain  effects  result  from 
certain  given  causes."  "  We  must  not  say  'that  the  bird 
has  wings  in  order  to  fly ;  but  that  it  flies  because  it  has 
wings.'  But  wherein,  I  ask  you,  are  these  two  propositions 
contradictory?  In  assuming  that  a  bird  has  wings  in 
order  to  fly,  must  not  its  flight  result  from  the  structure 
of  these  wings?  Consequently,  because  the  flight  is  a 
result,  is  it  right  to  conclude  that  it  is  not  at  the  same  time 
an  end  ?  Would  it  then  be  necessary,  in  order  to  recognize 
final  causes,  that  you  should  see  in  nature  effects  without 
a  cause  or  effects  disproportioned  to  these  causes  ?" 

We  are  in  danger  at  this  present  time  of  a  whole  swarm 
of  young  naturalists,  following  one  or  two  leaders,  attack- 
ing final  cause  without  knowing  what  it  means.  We  are 
happy,  in  these  circumstances,  to  have  a  work  by  a  French 
philosopher  which  rests  the  doctrine  on  the  proper  footing, 
and  coi-rects  the  misapprehensions  of  objectors.  It  is  not 
necessary  to  give  an  epitome  of  M.  Janet's  "  Final  Causes." 
Those  interested  in  the  subject  will  go  directly  to  the  work 
now  so  accessible.  Any  one  perplexed  may  here  have  his 
thoughts  cleared  up.  Those  who  would  oppose  final  cause 
must  attempt  to  answer  it,  and  as  they  do  so  they  may  find 


54  FINAL  cau^;e. 

every  objection  to  tlie  doctrine  effectively  disposed  of.  He 
sliows  first  as  a  matter  of  fact,  and  this  independent  of  any 
theological  bearing,  that  there  is  finality  or  teleology  in 
natnre.  He  founds  "  the  existence  of  the  final  cause  on 
this  principle,  that  when  a  complex  combination  of  hetero- 
geneous phenomena  is  found  to  agree  with  the  possibility 
of  a  future  act  which  was  not  contained  beforehand  in  any 
of  these  phenomena  in  particular,  this  agreement  can  only 
be  comprehended  by  the  human  mind  by  a  kind  of  pre- 
existence  in  an  ideal  form  of  the  future  act  itself,  which 
transforms  from  a  result  into  an  end — that  is  to  say,  into 
a  final  cause."  He  shows,  secondly,  that  this  teleology 
implies  an  intelligent  cause. 

He  is  particularly  successful  in  showing  that  develop- 
ment, so  far  from  superseding  final  cause,  implies  it 
throughout.  Hugh  Miller  had  said,  in  criticising  the 
"  Vestiges  of  Creation,"  that  development  does  not  affect 
the  argument  for  the  Divine  existence.  Professor  Huxley 
allows  this  fully.  Professor  Asa  Gray  discovers  an  order 
and  design  in  development.  But  M.  Janet  has  discussed  the 
subject  more  fully.  JSTo  one  will  maintain  that  development 
is  a  simple  mechanical  law.  It  is  the  law  of  a  most  compli- 
cated correlation  of  forces,  most  of  which  are  as  yet  un- 
known. When  these  are  detected,  by  some  jSTewton  of 
physiology  yet  to  appear,  it  will  be  seen  that  development, 
always  kept  within  its  proper  sphere,  more  perhaps  than 
any  other  process  of  nature  involves  a  complexitj^  of  ad- 
justments all  tending  toward  a  point,  the  preservation,  and 
T  believe  the  gradual  elevation,  of  plants  and  animals. 

Professor  Xewcomb's  discourse  is  on  the  Course  of  Ma- 
ture. But  there  is  vastly  more  in  that  organized  course 
than  he  and  other  scientists  are  noticing,  I  have  endeav- 
ored to  spread  out  that  rich  web,  of  which  the  forces  which 
he  has  looked  at  are  the  mere  threads.  I  have  proceeded  on 


VARIOUS   CAUSES   IN   NATURE.  55 

the  fourfold  explanation  of  nature  by  Aristotle,  only  modi- 
f  jing  it  somewhat  to  adapt  it  to  modern  science.  All 
that  I  insist  on  is  that  nature  cannot  be  understood,  ex- 
cept by  such  principles  as  those  I  have  been  unfolding.  I 
discover  not  only  force  which  hurries  on  like  a  railway  train, 
but  rails  to  restrain  it  and  intelligence  guiding  it.  I  find  not 
only  mechanism,  but  machines  constructed  for  ends.  The 
mechanical  doctrine,  if  carried  out  exclusively,  would  strip 
nature  of  all  that  endears  it  to  us  — of  all  its  sunshine,  of 
all  its  beauty  and  beneficence,  and  leave  nothing  to  call 
forth  our  admiration,  our  gratitude,  our  love.  A  skeleton 
is  an  interesting  object  to  an  anatomist,  but  I  love  to  see 
it  clothed  with  form  and  color  and  expression.  I  am  in- 
terested in  the  restless  activity  of  nature,  capable  of  work- 
ing such  effects  for  evil  or  for  good  ;  but  I  do  not  feel 
assurance,  and  my  soul  is  not  elevated  to  adoration  till  I 
see  the  powers  harmoniously  joining  to  produce  regular 
laws,  and^types  after  their  kind,  and  intelligible  species, 
and  special  ends  of  support  and  benignity.  Pythagoras 
uttered  a  profound  truth,  and  had  doubtless  glimpses  of 
its  meaning,  when  he  said  that  if  men's  perceptions  were 
sufficiently  acute  they  would  hear  the  music  of  the  spheres, 
being,  I  may  add,  the  voice  of  One  boldly  represented  by 
an  old  prophet  as  '^  joying  over  His  works  with  singing." 


The    Emotions. 


IKY 


JAMES  McCOSH,  D.D.,  LL.D., 

Preside ni  of  Princeton   College. 


One  Volume,  crown  Svo.,  _        _        _        $2.00c 

In  this  little  volume  of  two  hundred  and  fifty  clearly  printed  pages 
Dr.  McCosh  treats  first  of  the  elements  of  emotion,  and,  secondly,  of  the 
classification  and  description  of  the  emotions.  He  has  been  led  to  the 
consideration  of  his  theme,  as  he  says  in  his  preface,  by  the  vagueness  and 
ambiguity  in  common  thought  and  literature  in  connection  with  the  subject, 
and  by  "  the  tendency  on  the  part  of  the  prevailing  physiological  psychol- 
ogy of  the  day  to  resolve  all  feeling  and  our  very  emotions  into  nervous 
action,  and  thus  gain  an  important  province  of  our  nature  to  materialism." 
The  work  is  characterized  by  that  "  peculiarly  animated  and  commanding 
style  which  seems  to  be  a  part  of  the  author." 


CRITICAL.     NOTICES. 

"Dr.  McCosh's  style  is  as  lucid,  vigorous,  and  often  beautiful  as  of  old.  There 
3s  never  any  doubt  as  to  his  meaning,  nur  any  hesitation  in  his  utteiance." — London 
A  cadetny. 

"  It  would  be  well  if  all  who  have  it  as  the'r  business  to  influence  the  character  of 
men  would  study  such  a  work  as  this  on  the  Emotions." — Examiner  and  Chronicle. 

"We  recommend  it  to  all  students  as  a  perspicuous  and  graceful  contribution  to 
•what  has  always  proved  to  be  the  most  popular  part  of  mental  philosophy." — The  N.  Y. 
Evufigelist. 

"  The  work  is  marked  by  great  clearness  of  statement  and  profound  scholarship — two 
thinsis  which  are  not  always  combined.  ...  It  will  prove  attractive  and  instructive 
to  any  intelligent  reader."— ^/^J^w^  Evening  Journal. 

"The  analysis  is  clear  and  the  style  of  crystalline  clearness.       We  are  inclined  to 

think  it  will  be  the  most  popular  of  the  author's  works.  We  have  read  it  from  beginning 

to  end  with  intense  enjoyment — with  as  much  interest,  indeed,  as  could  attach  to  any 
work  of  fiction." — The  Presbyterian. 

"  The  whole  subject  of  the  volume  is  treated  by  Dr.  McCosh  in  a  common  sense  way, 
with  large  reference  to  its  practical  applications,  aiming  at  clearness  of  expression  and 
aDtne>s  of  illustration,  rather  than  with  any  show  of  metaphysical  acuteness  or  technical 
nicety,  and  often  with  uncommon  beauty  and  force  of  diction." — N.  Y.  Tribune. 

"Apart  from  the  comprehension  of  the  entire  argument,  any  chapter  and  almost 
every  section  will  prove  a  quickening  and  nourishing  portion  to  many  who  will  ponder 
it.  It  will  be  a  liberal  feeder  of  pastors  and  preachers  who  turn  to  it.  The  almost 
prodigal  outlay  of  illustrations  to  be  found  from  first  to  finis,  will  fascuiate  the  reader  if 
nothing  else  does." — Christian  Intetligencer. 


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CHARLES   SCRIBNER'S  SONS,  Publishers, 

743  AND  745  Broadway,  New  York. 


The  Conflicts  of  the  Age, 


One  Vol.,  8vo,       -       Paper,  50  Cts.  ;   Cloth,  75  Cts, 


The  four   articles  which   make   up  this  little   volume  are  : 

(i)  An  Advertisement  for  a  New  Religion.     By  an  Evolutionist. 

(2)  The  Confession  of  an  Agnostic.     By   an   Agnostic. 

(3)  "'A/^hat  Morality  have  we  left  ?     By  a  New-Light  Moralist. 

(4)  Review    of  th^    Fight.       By   a   Yankee    Farmer. 

The  secret  of  its  authorship  has  not   yet   transpired,  and  the  reviewers 
:em  badly  puzzled  in  their  attempts  to  solve  the  mystery. 


CRITICAL.     NOTICES. 

"Nowhere  can  an  ordinary  reader  see  in  a  more  simple  and  pleasing  form  the 
absurdities  which  lie  iu  the  modem  speculaii..ns  about  Irutli  and  duly.  We  have  no  key 
to  the  authorsliip,  but  the  writer  evidently  holds  a  practiced  pen,  aiul  knows  how  to  c;i\  e 
that  air  of  fxirsijinge  in  treating  of  serious  subjects  whic;h  sometimes  is  more  eifective 
than  the  most  cogent  dialectic."  —  Christian  Intelligenctr. 

"It  is  the  keenest,  bist  sustained  exposure  of  the  weaknesses  inherent  in  cer'ain 
schools  of  modern  thought,  whici  we  have  yet  come  across,  and  is  couched  in  a  vein  of 
fine  satire,  making  it  exceedinsi'y  readable.  For  an  insight  into  the  systems  it  touches 
upon,  and  for  its  suggestion-  oi  methods  of  meeting  them,  it  is  capable  of  bemg  a  great 
help  to  the  clergy.  It  is  a  new  d  parture  in  apologetics,  quite  in  the  spirit  of  the  time.'' — 
The  Living  Church, 

"The  writer  has  chosen  to  appear  anonymously;  but  he  holds  a  pen  keen  as  a 
Damascus  blade.  Indeed,  there  are  few  men  living  capable  of  writing  these  papers, 
and  of  dissecting  so  thorouehly  the  popular  conceits  and  shams  of  the  day.  It  is  done, 
too,  with  a  coolness,  self-possession,  and  sang-froid,  that  are  inimitable,  however  un- 
comfortable it  may  seem  to  the  writhing  victims." — The  Guardian. 

"  These  four  papers  are  unqualifiedly  good.  They  show  a  thorough  acquaintance 
with  the  whole  range  of  philosophic  thought  in  its  modern  phases  of  development,  even 
down  to  the  latest  involutions  and  convolutions  of  the  Plvolutionists,  the  sage  unknow- 
aljleness  of  the  Agnostic,  and  the  New  Light  novelty  of  Ethics  without  a  conscience."  — 
Lutheran  Church  Review. 

*'  These  papers  are  as  able  as  thev  are  readable,  and  are  not  offensive  in  their  spirit, 
beyond  the  necessary  offensiveness  of  belief  to  the  believing  mind."' — N.  Y.  Christian. 

Advocate. 

"The  discussion  is  sprightly,  incisive,  and  witty;  and  whoever  begins  to  read  it 
will  be  likely  to  read  it  through." — Neiu  Knglaftder. 


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:e,    by 

CHARLES  SCRIBNER'S  SONS,   Publlshers, 

743  AND  745   Broadway,  New  York. 


DR.  McCOSH'S  AVORKS, 

PUBLISHED   BY 

ROBEET  CARTER  A1^T>   BROTHERS, 

NEW   YORK. 


I. 

Eleventh  Thousand. 
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TYPICAL  FORMS  AND  SPECIAL  ENDS  IN  CREATION. 

By  James  McCosh,  LL.D.,  and  Dr.  Dickie.     8vo.     $2.00. 

"It  illustrates  and  carries  out  the  great  principle  of  analogy  in  the 
Divine  plans  and  works  far  more  minutely  and  satisfactorily  than  it  has 
been  done  before  ;  and  while  it  presents  the  results  of  the  most  pro- 
found scientific  research,  it  presents  them  in  their  higher  and  sxairitual 
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HI. 
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THE  INTUITIONS   OF   THE   IMIND.     New  and  improved 
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' "  Never  was  such  a  work  so  much  needed  as  in  the  present  day.  It 
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Bain,  and  Herbert  Spencer,  which  is  so  steadily  prevailing  among  the 
students  of  the  present  generation. " — London  Quarterly  Review,  April^ 
1865. 

rv. 

Second  Thousand. 
A   DEFENCE   OF  FUNDAMENTAL  TRUTH.     Being  an 
Examination  of  Mr.  J.  S.  Mill's  Philosophy.    8vo.  $2.00. 

"  The  spirit  of  these  discussions  is  admirable.  Fearless  and  courte- 
ous, McCosh  never  hesitates  to  bestow  praise  when  merited,  nor  to  attack 
a  heresy  wherever  found." — Congregational  Review. 


V.  ; 

Third  Edition. 

SCOTTISH  PHILOSOPHY  :  Biographical,  Expositoey,  and  : 
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*'Dr.  McCosh's  expositions  of  philosophical  doctrine  are  no  less  re-  I 
markable  for  their  lucidity  than  their  fairness.  Nor  is  his  volume  j 
confined  to  the  mere  analysis  and  exhibition  of  speculative  theories.  It 
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names  of  Scotland  in  their  domestic  and  social  environment,  and  make  j 
its  perusal  as  attractive  as  it  is  informing." — Tribune.  ■ 

YL,  \ 

I 
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LAWS  OF  DISCUESn^E  THOUGHT  :  Being  a  Text-Book  ' 
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"This  little  treatise  is  interesting  as  containing  the  matured  views  of 
one  of  the  most  vigorous  reasoners  of  the  times  on  the  forms  of  reason- 
ing. It  is  written  with  singular  directness  and  vigor.  .  .  .  The  ; 
use  of  this  work  as  a  text-book  in  schools  and  colleges  will  afford  admir-  \ 
able  training  to  students.  .  .  .  It  is  doubtful  whether  there  is  any-  i 
where  a  class-book  in  this  science  likely  to  be  so  generally  acceptable."  i 
— Evening  Post.  \ 

vn. 

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CHEISTIANITY  AND  POSITIVISM.  A  Series  of  Lectures  ! 
to  the  Times  on  Natural  Theology  and  Apologetics,  i 
12mo.     $1.75. 

'*  Dr.  McCosh  is  a  man  of  great  learning,  of  powerful  intellect,  clear, 
and  sharp,  and  bold  in  utterance.  These  lectures  present  the  result  of 
years  of  labor,  in  a  form  to  be  useful  to  all  classes  of  minds,  and  espe- 
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the  skeptical  suggestions  of  some  modern  naturalists.  The  volume  will 
prove  immensely  valuable  to  ministers  and  Bible-class  teachers,  as  it  : 
furnishes  ready  and  conclusive  answers  to  objectors  and  skeptics,  and  ! 
assurance  to  inquiring  minds.  It  is  an  able  and  timely  book. " — Baptist 
Union. 


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